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ABSTRACT
This article provides a rationale for understanding and interpreting the “public use”
requirement within eminent domain law. The rationale is based on two factors. First,
while the government often needs the power of eminent domain to avoid the problem of
strategic holdout, private parties are usually able to purchase property through secret
buying agents. The availability of these buying agents makes the use of eminent domain
for private parties unnecessary (and indeed, undesirable). The government, however, is
ordinarily unable to make secret purchases because its plans are subject to democratic
deliberation and known in advance. Second, while the use of eminent domain for
traditional public objectives does not create a danger of corruption, the use of such
power for private parties invites the potential for inordinate influence. Private parties
that directly benefit from takings can obtain a concentrated benefit and often pay little for
acquiring properties. These parties thus have a strong incentive to influence the eminent
domain process for their own advantage. In light of this analysis, the article finds that
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kelo v. City of New London and decisions in
several other important cases are problematic. The article concludes that the theory of
public use based on secret purchases and private influence provides a socially desirable,
judicially administrable, and constitutionally legitimate mechanism for distinguishing
between public and private uses and reforming the law of eminent domain.

*

Fellow, John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, & Business, Harvard Law School. J.D., Harvard
Law School; B.A., University of Notre Dame. (dkelly@post.harvard.edu) I am indebted to Laura Beny,
Steve Calindrillo, Marcus Cole, Robert Ellickson, Richard Epstein, Noah Feldman, Nicole Garnett, Mary
Ann Glendon, Alan Morrison, Richard Posner, David Rosenberg, and Joseph Singer for their valuable
comments and suggestions. I would also like to thank A. Mitchell Polinsky for inviting me to deliver an
earlier version of this paper at Stanford Law School and Steven Shavell for inviting me to deliver an earlier
version of this paper at Harvard Law School. A special word of thanks is due to Steven Shavell for many
helpful comments and discussions. I am grateful as well to the John M. Olin Center for research support.

ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................1

II.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK ......................................................6
A. A Short History of “Public Use” .....................................................6
B. The Overruling of Poletown ............................................................8
C. Kelo v. City of New London ..........................................................11

III.

A RATIONALE FOR THE PUBLIC USE REQUIREMENT .............................12
A. Secret Purchases ............................................................................12
1. Circumventing the Holdout Problem .......................................12
2. Enabling Socially Desirable Transfers ....................................15
3. Distinguishing Governmental Takings ....................................19
B. Inordinate Private Influence ...........................................................20
1. The Concentrated Benefit Problem ..........................................20
2. The Costless Acquisition Problem ...........................................22
3. The Resource Disparity Problem .............................................24
C. Counterarguments ..........................................................................26
1. Positive Externalities ...............................................................26
2. Timing Problems and Collusion ………………......................28
3. Distrust and Resentment ......................................................... 29

IV. APPLICATIONS OF THE NEW THEORY ....................................................31
A. Kelo and Economic Development .................................................31
B. Berman and Urban Blight ..............................................................34
C. Instrumentalities and Utilities ........................................................38
VI. CONCLUSION: THE NEW THEORY AND ITS ADVANTAGES ....................
40

The “Public Use” Requirement in Eminent Domain Law:
A Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influence
© 2006 Daniel B. Kelly. All rights reserved.

“[W]hen we come to inquire what are public uses for which the right of
compulsory taking may be employed, and what are private uses for which the
right is forbidden, we find no agreement, either in reasoning or conclusion.”
-UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1908)1
“Further efforts at providing a precise definition of ‘public use’ are doomed
to fail . . . .”
-NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN (2003)2
I. INTRODUCTION
The Public Use Clause3 of the Fifth Amendment has not been interpreted in a
manner that has been regarded as intellectually compelling, despite numerous attempts to
discern its meaning by the courts and by legal commentators.4 The primary controversy
has been whether, or under what circumstances, the state may use the power of eminent
domain for the benefit of a private party by deeming the private party’s use a public use.
One view holds that a taking requires either public ownership or public access. Under
this view, the government may utilize eminent domain for a post office, airport, or
highway.5 A contrasting view argues that eminent domain can be justified for any private
use so long as the taking ostensibly produces a general public benefit. Under this view, a
taking might be justified to enable a private party to develop real estate, build a factory,
or construct a stadium or casino.6

1

Hairston v. Danville & Western Ry. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 606 (1908).
2A P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN (3d ed. rev. 2003, J. Sackman ed.) § 7.02[7] [hereinafter NICHOLS].
3
U.S. Const. amend. V (“nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation”).
The Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the public use requirement against the states. See Chicago B. &
Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). Forty-nine state constitutions have similar public use clauses.
4
See Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of Takings, 112
HARV. L. REV. 997, 997 (1999) (concluding that “Supreme Court decisions over the last three-quarters of a
century have turned the words of the Takings Clause into a secret code that only a momentary majority of
the Court is able to understand”); Note, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance
Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599, 605-06 (1949) [hereinafter Requiem] (describing a “massive body of case law,
irreconcilable in its inconsistency, confusing it its detail and defiant of all attempts at classification”).
5
See, e.g., Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1876) (upholding condemnations for post offices); Kansas
City v. Hon, 972 S.W.2d 407 (Mo. App. 1998) (upholding condemnations for airport); Arnold v. Covington
& Cincinnati Bridge Co., 1 Duv. 372 (Ky. 1864) (upholding condemnations for highways).
6
See, e.g., City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 1 (Nev. 2003)
(upholding condemnations for casino consortium); Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835 (Cal. 1982)
(upholding condemnation of sports franchise); Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304
N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981) (upholding condemnations for General Motors factory); Courtesy Sandwich
Shop, Inc. v. Port of New York Auth., 190 N.E.2d 402 (N.Y. 1963) (upholding condemnations for World
Trade Center).
2
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Concurring predominantly with this latter view, the United States Supreme Court,
as well as lower federal and state courts, have found a broad spectrum of private projects
consistent with the public use requirement, thereby allowing private developers to benefit
from eminent domain.7 As a result, the number of takings for private parties has
increased dramatically in recent years.8 In Riviera Beach, Florida, for example, a $1.25
billion redevelopment project may demolish 1,700 homes and 300 businesses and
displace 5,100 people.9 In San Jose, California, one-tenth of the city’s total area, which
includes one-third of its population, is currently subject to condemnation.10 And in a
smaller (but possibly more extreme) example, one Florida family, already outraged that
its home was being condemned to build a golf course, was informed that the home—
instead of being demolished—would be converted into the golf course manager’s new
living quarters, which the court upheld as a public necessity.11
While many commentators therefore agree that the current takings doctrine can be
used to justify “virtually any exercise of the eminent domain power,”12 tworecent
cases—the Michigan Supreme Court’s overruling of Poletown Neighborhood Council v.
City of Detroit13 and the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New
London14—have necessitated a reexamination of this issue. In light of these cases, this
article analyzes the meaning that ought to be given the public use requirement in order to
advance social welfare. The article develops a judicially administrable method of
interpreting public use based on two important yet previously underappreciated factors:
namely, that private parties but not the government can ordinarily assemble property
using secret buying agents—meaning that private parties, unlike the government, usually
do not need the power of eminent domain to overcome the problem of strategic holdout;
and that takings for private projects invite the potential for inordinate private influence as
private parties seek to exploit the eminent domain process for their own advantage.
7

See, e.g., Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (“[W]here the exercise of
eminent domain is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a
compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause.”) (emphasis added); Gamble v. Eau Claire
County, 5 F.3d 285, 287 (7th Cir. 1993) (“We can find no case in the last half century where a taking was
squarely held to be for a private use.”).
8
See DANA BERLINER, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE GAIN: A FIVE-YEAR, STATE-BY-STATE REPORT
EXAMINING THE ABUSE OF EMINENT DOMAIN (2003) (documenting over 10,000 actual or threatened cases
of private takings between 1998 and 2003).
9
See Scott McCabe, Residents Vow to Fight Riviera Plan, THE PALM BEACH POST, Dec. 17, 2001, at 1B;
Thomas R. Collins, Many Businesses Feeling Put Out By Riviera Plans, THE PALM BEACH POST, Jan. 6,
2003, at 1A.
10
See Evans v. City of San Jose, No. H026802, 2004 WL 2542805, at *3 (Cal. App. 6 Dist. July 22,
2004); see also BERLINER, supra note 8, at 3.
11
See Zamecnik v. Palm Beach County, 768 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. App. 2000) (per curiam); see also Marc
Caputo, County to Seize Couple’s Home So Golf Manager Can Have It, THE PALM BEACH POST, May 6,
2000, at 1A.
12
Ralph Nader & Alan Hirsch, Making Eminent Domain Humane, 49 VILL. L. REV. 207, 212-13 (2004);
see also Jennifer J. Kruckeberg, Note, Can the Government Buy Everything?: The Takings Clause and the
Erosion of the “Public Use” Requirement, 87 MINN. L. REV. 543, 565-66 (2002) (concluding that
“evolution of the public use requirement of the eminent domain power virtually obliterated any limitation
on the government”).
13
304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981), overruled in County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W. 2d 765 (Mich.
2004).
14
545 U.S. __, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005).
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The usual justification for allowing private parties to benefit from the use of
eminent domain is the same as that for the government: this power may be needed to
overcome the “holdout” problem caused by strategically-acting sellers if property had to
be purchased.15 In the absence of eminent domain, a buyer would confront a holdout
problem in cases involving the assembly of multiple properties for a single project. Any
potential seller, knowing that her single property is necessary for the entire project, could
“hold out” in order to obtain an inflated price.16 This strategic behavior could prevent the
transaction (and consequently, the entire project) from occurring.17 According to this
conventional wisdom, private parties seeking to assemble multiple properties are just as
afflicted by the holdout problem as the government and thus just as much in need of the
power of eminent domain to overcome the problem.
In this article, however, I explain thattakings for the benefit of private parties are
usually unnecessary—even if the private project potentially also has a public benefit—
because private parties do not in fact face the holdout problem. Specifically, private
parties can avoid the holdout problem using secret buying agents, which provide an
alternative and (as will be demonstrated) socially superior mechanism for effecting
transfers of property. In contrast, the nature of public scrutiny and the transparency of
democratic deliberation tend to prevent the state from using secret buying agents to
facilitate traditional public takings.
As a result, the takings power—while necessary for the state—is ordinarily
unnecessary for private parties who can obtain and assemble property through buying
agents. Perhaps surprisingly, this fundamental point has not been properly appreciated.
Although some commentators and courts have noted in passing that private parties
sometimes employ buying agents,18 these commentators have not recognized the
importance of this stratagem and, significantly, have not noticed that, because
government usually cannot employ this technique, secret purchases provide a mechanism
for distinguishing between public and private uses.
While the use of secret buying agents may at first seem implausible, private
parties can (and indeed, already do) use buying agents to overcome the holdout problem
and assemble property. Harvard University, for example, working through a real estate
15

See Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and The Single Owners: One More Salute to Ronald
Coase, 36 J. L. & E. 553, 572 (1993) (stating that eminent domain is used “typically to prevent holdouts”);
Thomas Merrill, Rent Seeking and the Compensation Principle, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1561, 1570 (1986)
(book review) (pointing out that eminent domain “traditionally has been employed to promote a more
efficient allocation of resources by overcoming holdouts and free riders”); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 41-42 (2d ed. 1977) (maintaining that eminent domain power is justified in economic
terms only in the context of certain holdout situations); see also infra notes 87-88 (citing cases).
16
See Steve P. Calandrillo, Eminent Domain and Economics: Should “Just Compensation” Be Abolished
and Would “Takings Insurance” Work Instead?, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 451, 468 (2003) (describing the classic
holdout problem if an assembly project becomes public knowledge); EUGENE SILBERBERG, PRINCIPLES OF
MICROECONOMICS 288 (2d ed. 1999) (same).
17
See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 124-25 (2004) (“[T]he problem
of an impasse in bargaining may become severe when there are many private owners who own parcels and
when, if any one of them does not sell, the whole project would be seriously affected or halted.”).
18
See Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 81 (1986) (pointing
out that “real estate developers and others are frequently able to assemble such parcels by using buying
agents, option agreements, straw transactions, and the like”); POSNER, supra note 15, at 43-44 (noting that
shopping center developers and others can overcome holdout problems without using eminent domain).
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development company, used secret agents to avoid strategic sellers and purchase fourteen
parcels of land for $88 million.19 Similarly, Disney has used buying agents in Orlando,
Florida and Manassas, Virginia to assemble thousands of acres for its theme parks.20 One
circuit court has pointed out that, among shopping center developers and real estate
purchasers, the use of these agents is a “common arms-length business practice.”21 And
even the U.S. Supreme Court recently recognized that “private developers can use
numerous techniques, including secret negotiations or precommitment strategies, to
overcome holdout problems and assemble lands for genuinely profitable projects.”22
The use of eminent domain for private parties, however, is not only unnecessary
but actually socially undesirable because eminent domain (unlike acquisitions through
secret purchases) sometimes leads to inefficient transfers. Because there is no
mechanism for determining how much existing owners actually (i.e., subjectively) value
their property, courts routinely ignore actual value, and instead rely on the “fair market
value” of damages to determine “just compensation” for the condemnee’s loss. However,
because market value neither calculates nor compensates a taking’s full costs (i.e., the
actual value to the existing owners), a socially undesirable transfer may occur whenever
the existing owners’ subjective value deviates from the court-determined objective value.
As a result, eminent domain may force a transfer where the existing owners value the
land more than the private assembler.23
Unlike eminent domain, secret buying agents facilitate transfers if and only if the
transfer is socially desirable. Buying agents thereby eliminate the risk of erroneous
condemnations. Voluntary exchange using buying agents allows the existing owners’
subjective value to be taken into account while preventing existing owners from
strategically inflating that value. As a result, a transfer will occur only if the value to the
assembler is greater than the actual value to the existing owners. Requiring voluntary
transactions through secret purchases thus enables mutually beneficial transactions to
occur, while preventing the socially undesirable transactions that eminent domain
sometimes allows. Buying agents therefore provide not only an alternative but also a
superior mechanism to eminent domain for private transfers by combining the primary
advantage of eminent domain (namely, overcoming bargaining problems) with the
primary advantage of consensual exchange (namely, ensuring that transfers are socially
desirable).
19

See Tina Cassidy & Don Aucoin, Harvard Reveals Secret Purchases of 52 Acres Worth $88 Million in
Allston, BOSTON GLOBE, June 10, 1997, at A1 (explaining that Harvard bought land “without revealing its
identity to the sellers, residents, local politicians, or city officials because property owners would have
drastically inflated the prices if they knew Harvard was the buyer”).
20
See Tim O’Reiley, Playing Secret Agent for Mickey Mouse; Lawyers Ran Dummy Corporations,
Bought Real Estate for Disney, LEGAL TIMES (Washington, D.C.), Jan. 10, 1994, at 2 (describing “Disney’s
elaborate scheme to hide its identity as it amassed about 3,000 acres for a proposed theme park in Northern
Virginia”); Mark Andrews, Disney Assembled Cast of Buyers To Amass Land Stage for Kingdom,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 30, 1993, at K2 (explaining how, “[w]orking under a strict cloak of secrecy, real
estate agents who didn’t know the identity of their client began making offers to landowners”).
21
Westgate Village Shopping Center v. Lion Dry Goods Co., 21 F.3d 429 (Table), 1994 WL 108959, at
*7 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating that using secret buying agents to develop shopping centers is “a common
arms-length business practice that has to do with keeping real estate prices from escalating”).
22
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. __, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 2668 n.24 (2005).
23
See infra notes 109-19 and accompanying text.
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The use of eminent domain for private parties should also be disfavored for a
second reason: private takings allow inordinate private influence to distort the eminent
domain process. In a taking primarily for a private benefit (e.g., the assembly of land for
a real estate development), the single beneficiary of the taking (the developer) can obtain
a relatively concentrated benefit. By contrast, in a taking primarily for public benefit
(e.g., the acquisition of land for a new highway), the beneficiaries of the taking (the
future users of the road) are more numerous and can only obtain a relatively dispersed
benefit. As a result, because they typically obtain a substantial benefit, private parties
that would directly benefit from takings have a stronger incentive than the general public
to subvert the takings power for their own advantage. A private taking thus involves a
greater potential for inordinate private influence than a traditional public taking.
Using eminent domain for private parties also tends to encourage two additional
types of inordinate influence. First, private parties that directly benefit from the state’s
use of eminent domain are usually not required to reimburse the state for the cost of the
takings. Because they can use eminent domain to acquire land costlessly for their own
objectives, these private actors have an incentive to overutilize eminent domain and
engage in excessive takings. Second, potential private beneficiaries can also exploit
disparities in legal and financial resources to obtain the state’s condemnation authority.
Indeed, while the primary beneficiaries of private takings tend to be real-estate
developers, casino consortia, and large national or multi-national corporations, the
primary victims of these takings tend to be the economically disadvantaged, the elderly,
and racial and ethnic minorities.24
Hence, because of the increased potential for
inordinate private influence, as well as the superiority of secret buying agents, eminent
domain should generally not be used on behalf of private parties.
Finally, this article analyzes several potential counterarguments to the foregoing
rationale for the public use requirement. The primary objection involves the possibility
of positive externalities—i.e., benefits to the community that parties to the transaction
cannot internalize.25 In certain situations where a significant externality exists, a
project’s private benefit may not be substantial enough to induce private parties to
assemble the property even though the externality makes the project socially desirable.
While a common solution to this type of externality is the use of a public subsidy,26 a
subsidy may not be feasible ex ante while maintaining the anonymity of secret buying
agents. However, such a subsidy may be feasible ex post to provide private parties with
the sufficient ex ante incentive to undertake the project through secret purchases. This
article addresses positive externalities (as well as several other counterarguments
regarding timing problems, collusion, distrust and resentment) and analyzes under what
circumstances (if any) these objections would alter the preceding analysis.
Overall, however, this article suggests that the current public use test, focusing as
it does on the character of the use, is misconceived because takings for private parties are
unnecessary (and indeed, often socially undesirable). The article thus reexamines the
24

See infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
On externalities, see generally PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 751
(15th ed. 1995); THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 146 (David W. Pearce ed., 4th ed. 1992).
26
See generally A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 172-203 (1932); A.C. PIGOU, WEALTH AND
WELFARE 148-71 (1912). For a recent analysis, see Steven Shavell, The Optimal Structure of Law
Enforcement, 36 J.L & ECON. 255 (1993).
25
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public use requirement and articulates a new theory based on secret purchases and private
influence.
Part II reviews the constitutional framework, including two recent
developments: the overruling of Poletown and the holding in Kelo. Part III, which
contains the heart of the economic analysis, examines secret buying agents and inordinate
private influence, as well as several potential counterarguments. Part IV applies this
economic analysis to the two most common situations: the assembly of land for economic
development, illustrated using Kelo, and the elimination of urban blight, illustrated using
Berman v. Parker. Part V concludes that this new rationale for the public use
requirement is not only socially desirable, judicially administrable, and constitutionally
legitimate but also superior to the status quo as a mechanism for distinguishing between
public and private uses in both legislative and judicial decisionmaking.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
A. A Short History of “Public Use”
The government’s sovereign authority to seize property for “public use” if it
provides “just compensation” originated at English common law and appeared in
America as early as the seventeenth century.27 In colonial America, government officials
invoked the power of eminent domain rather infrequently, due in part to the relatively
limited number of uses for eminent domain at the time.28 However, James Madison, who
drafted the original language of the Public Use Clause, feared that the government’s
power to take property, if left unrestricted, could jeopardize private property rights.29
As a result, the drafters of the Bill of Rights adopted Madison’s proposal as part of the
Fifth Amendment, which limits the eminent domain power to the taking of “private
property . . . for public use.”30
Federal courts did not decide a case involving the federal government’s use of
eminent domain until 1875.31 But in several cases in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court held that takings for private parties with
incidental public benefits violated the Public Use or Due Process Clause.32
Thomas
27

See NICHOLS §7.01[3] (“The principle that private property may be taken for public uses can be traced
back to English common law where it was presumed that the king ultimately held the title to all the land.
This meant that if the king needed the property, he was permitted to take it.”) (citations omitted).
28
See Requiem, supra note 4, at 600 (“Prior to the adoption of the federal and early state constitutions,
governments rarely needed privately owned land.”).
29
See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 314-15 (1996) (noting that Madison’s “concern about the security of private rights was
rooted in a palpable fear that economic legislation was jeopardizing fundamental rights of property” and
that “by 1787 a decade of state legislation had enabled Madison to perceive how economic and financial
issues could forge broad coalitions across society, which could then actively manipulate the legislature to
secure their desired ends”).
30
U.S. Const. amend. V.
31
See Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
32
See, e.g., Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 369 (1905) (“[W]e do not . . . approv[e] of the broad
proposition that private party may be taken in all cases where the taking may promote the public interest
and tend to develop the natural resources of the State.”); Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Nebraska, 164
U.S. 403 (1896) (“The taking by a State of the private property of one person or corporation, without the
owner’s consent, for the private use of another, is not due process of law . . . .”).
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Cooley, one of the leading constitutional jurists of the nineteenth century, argued that
“the due protection of the rights of private property will preclude the government from
seizing it in the hands of the owner, and turning it over to another on vague grounds of
public benefit to spring from a more profitable use to which the latter will devote it.”33
Overall, the view of most nineteenth century jurists, as well as early Supreme Court
decisions, was that the use of eminent domain for these purposes violated the Public Use
Clause.34
However, due in part to the unprecedented technological innovation during the
second half of the nineteenth century, private corporations increasingly began to seek
(and sometimes obtain) the power to condemn property for their own objectives.35 As a
result, the Supreme Court, led by Justice Holmes, expanded the definition of public use
and repudiated the “use by the public” test.36 The Court interpreted the Public Use
Clause to require only that the legislature posit a conceivable “public purpose.”37 At the
same time, the Court announced that legislative determinations of public use should
receive significant deference from the judiciary.38 Indeed, following the Second World
War, the Supreme Court abandoned almost any judicial limitation on the use of eminent
domain by suggesting that a legislative determination of public use foreclosed judicial
review.39
Then, in the seminal case of Berman v. Parker,40 the Court reviewed a challenge
to the constitutionality of the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act.41 The Act
targeted blighted areas in the southwest portion of the nation’s Capitol.42 The appellants,
however, owned and operated a department store that was not blighted and that was “not
33

THOMAS COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 654 (1868).
See RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 178
(1985) (“The nineteenth century view, abstractly considered, was that it was a perversion of the public use
doctrine to acquire land by condemnation for these purposes.”).
35
See William A. Fischel, The Political Economy of Public Use in Poletown: How Federal Grants
Encourage Excessive Use of Eminent Domain, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 929, 930 (2004) (“As new
technologies changed modes of transportation and production, private firms were often lent the right of
eminent domain.”) (citing JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 75-78 (1992)).
36
See Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co., 240 U.S. 30, 32 (1916)
(Holmes, J.) (concluding that “[t]he inadequacy of the use by the general public as a universal test is
established”); Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527 (1906) (Holmes, J.) (stating that
earlier cases have “recognized the inadequacy of use by the general public as a universal test” (citing Clark,
198 U.S. at 369).
37
See Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co., 240 U.S. at 32 (equating “public use” with “public
purpose”); Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 161 (1896) (noting that eminent domain
could be conferred if “property . . . was to be taken for a public purpose”).
38
See Old Dominion v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925) (Holmes, J.) (emphasizing that when
“Congress has declared the purpose to be a public use . . . [i]ts decision is entitled to deference until it is
shown to involve an impossibility.”); Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 709 (1923) (asserting that
power of appropriating private property for public use “resides in the Legislature” and is “not a judicial
question”).
39
See United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 551-52 (1946) (stating
that “it is the function of Congress to decide what type of taking is for a public use and that the agency
authorized to do the taking may do so to the full extent of its statutory authority”).
40
348 U.S. 26 (1954).
41
60 Stat. 790, D.C. Code 1951 §§ 5-701 to 5-719 (1945).
42
Berman, 348 U.S. at 28.
34

8
used as a dwelling or place of habitation.”43 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice
Douglas upheld the condemnation and stated that “[s]ubject to specific constitutional
limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in
terms well-nigh conclusive.”44 The holding of Berman confirmed the Court’s expansive
definition of public use and its Holmesian deference to legislative determinations.45
Thirty years later, in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,46 the Court considered
Hawaii’s efforts to remedy the islands’ concentrated land ownership. Hawaii permitted
tenants to request governmental condemnations of their landlord’s property and then
allowed these tenants to purchase the property for a nominal fee.47 Writing for a
unanimous Court, Justice O’Connor upheld the condemnations and reiterated that the
Court “will not substitute its judgment for a legislature’s judgment as to what constitutes
a public use ‘unless the use be palpably without reasonable foundation.’”48 Concluding
that the public use requirement is “coterminous with the scope of a sovereign’s police
powers,”49 the Court seemed to imply, as many commentators observed, that review of
legislative determinations of public use requires only minimal judicial scrutiny under the
rational basis standard (which applies to all other economic legislation).50 The Court’s
deferential approach in Midkiff signaled that almost any governmental taking, even those
involving private transfers, would qualify as a legitimate public use.51
B. The Overruling of Poletown
Most state courts, like the earliest federal decisions, originally favored the narrow
definition of public use. These state courts prohibited compulsory transfers between

43

Id. at 31.
Id. at 32.
45
See GEORGE SKOURAS, TAKINGS LAW AND THE SUPREME COURT: JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF THE
REGULATORY STATE’S ACQUISITION, USE AND CONTROL OF PRIVATE PROPERTY 44 (1998) (asserting that
in Berman the Supreme Court effectively “read this clause out of the Constitution”); James Geoffrey
Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on Eminent Domain, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1277, 1282 (1985)
(pointing out that “the Berman Court not only gave an unlimited meaning to public use, it also drew a very
limited role for courts reviewing whether such actions were taken in the public welfare”).
46
467 U.S. 229 (1984).
47
See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 481 (2001) (describing
Hawaii Land Reform Act of 1967).
48
Id. at 241 (quoting United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896)).
49
Id. at 244.
50
See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 47, at 480 (2001) (“[T]he contemporary Court has extended the
same deference toward legislative determinations of what constitutes ‘public use’ as it now does under
economic due process scrutiny.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 891
(1987) (“[T]he public use requirement has been rendered effectively unenforceable, much like the
rationality requirement of the due process clause post-Lochner.”); BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 190 n. 5 (1977) (“[A]ny state purpose otherwise constitutional should
qualify as sufficiently ‘public’ to justify a taking.”).
51
See Thomas J. Loyne, Note, Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff: A Final Requiem for the Public Use
Limitation on Eminent Domain?, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 388 (1985) (“The decision [in Midkiff] almost
ensures that all government takings will be upheld.”); Mark C. Landry, Note, The Public Use Requirement
in Eminent Domain—A Requiem, 60 TUL. L. REV. 419, 430 (1985) (“Justice O’Connor . . . has so narrowed
the scope of judicial review that overturning a legislatively authorized taking may be logically and
practically impossible.”).
44
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private parties even if they potentially included an incidental public benefit.52 However,
certain state courts increasingly began to follow the Supreme Court’s approach of
defining public use as any public purpose and deferring to legislative determinations of
public use.53 In the wake of Berman, for example, many state courts upheld the use of
eminent domain for private parties for a variety of urban renewal programs involving the
elimination of blight.54 Subsequently, many state courts expanded the definition of
public use to include promoting economic development even in the absence of blight.55
As a culmination of these precedents, Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of
Detroit came to be the most influential state case defining public use in the modern era.56
In Poletown, the city of Detroit utilized its eminent domain power to condemn an entire
neighborhood for the construction of a new General Motors manufacturing plant.57 The
affected homeowners argued that the takings constituted an unconstitutional private use
because the direct and primary beneficiary of the taking was General Motors. The
Michigan Supreme Court, however, upheld the condemnations by concluding that “public
use” and “public purpose” could be used interchangeably.58 The Court concluded that,
“even though a private party will also, ultimately, receive a benefit,” a municipality’s use
of eminent domain to alleviate unemployment and revitalize the local economy
constitutes two“essential public purposes.” 59
Relying on Poletown, many state courts interpreted their own state constitutions
in a similar manner and equated public use with public purpose.60 As a result, under most
52

See Eric R. Claeys, Public Use Limitations and Natural Property Rights, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 877,
901-05 (2004) (discussing the “public use” doctrine in the nineteenth century); see also Kelo, 545 U.S. __,
125 S.Ct. 2655, 2681-82 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (collecting early state court decisions). But see Philip
Nichols, Jr., The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U.L. REV. 615, 619-24
(1940) (discussing early state cases broadly defining “public use”).
53
See Kelo, 545 U.S. at __, 125 S.Ct. at 2662 (“[W]hile many state courts in the mid-19th century
endorsed ‘use by the public’ as the proper definition of public use, that narrow view steadily eroded over
time.”); see also JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 1182 (2002)
(“[M]ost state supreme courts have interpreted their state constitutions in a manner consistent with the
federal interpretation . . .”).
54
See, e.g., Mayor of Baltimore v. Chertkoff, 441 A.2d 1044, 1055 (Md. 1982) (relying on Berman to
conclude “urban renewal ordinance may lawfully command the condemnation of private industrial property
for public use in pursuance of a genuine urban renewal plan”).
55
See, e.g., Shreveport v. Chanse Gas Corp., 794 So.2d 962, 973 (La. App. 2001) (relying on Berman
and Midkiff to conclude that “economic development, in the form of a convention center and headquarters
hotel, satisfies the public purposes and public necessity requirement of [the state constitution]”), cert.
denied, 805 So.2d 209 (La. 2002); People ex rel. City of Urban v. Paley, 368 N.E.2d 915, 920-21 (Ill. 1977)
(finding that the public purpose “can no longer be restricted to areas where crime, vacancy, or physical
decay produce undesirable living conditions or imperil public health” but also extends to “[s]timulation of
commercial growth and removal of economic stagnation”).
56
304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
57
See NICHOLS § 7.06[7][c][iv] (tabulating that “[o]ver 465 acres, 3,500 people, and 1,176 buildings,
including 144 businesses, 3 schools, 16 churches, and 1 cemetery were taken by the City of Detroit for a
cost exceeding $ 200 million in order to provide land for a new General Motors facility”).
58
See Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 457 (noting that the “terms have been used interchangeably in Michigan
statutes and decisions in an effort to describe the protean concept of public benefit”) (citations omitted).
59
Id. at 459.
60
See, e.g., Jamestown v. Leevers, 552 N.W.2d 365, 369, 372-74 (N.D. 1996) (discussing Poletown and
concluding that “the stimulation of commercial growth and removal of economic stagnation . . . are
objectives satisfying the public use and purpose requirement”); City of Duluth v. State, 390 N.W.2d 757,
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state constitutions, as well as the U.S. Constitution,61 almost any conceivable justification
seemed to constitute a public use even if a private party received the primary benefit.62
However, unlike the deferential approach of Poletown and its progeny, several state
courts recently posited a less deferential interpretation of public use63 and reaffirmed the
distinction between public use and public purpose.64 As a result, an opportunity arose to
reconsider Poletown in County of Wayne v. Hathcock.65
Characterizing Poletown as a “radical departure from fundamental constitutional
principles,” the Michigan Supreme Court in Hathcock unanimously rejected the notion
that “a private entity’s pursuit of profit was a ‘public use’ . . . simply because one entity’s
profit maximization contributed to the health of the general economy.”66 The Court thus
held that condemnations for a 1,300-acre business park,67 which would be privately
owned and controlled, were unconstitutional under the Michigan Constitution. The
Hathcock Court noted that Poletown’s economic-benefit rationale would “validate
practically any exercise of the power of eminent domain on behalf of a private entity”
because “[e]very business, every productive unit in society does . . . contribute in some
way to the commonweal.”68 Because Poletown had provided the rationale for many state
decisions, its overruling signaled a potential shift in eminent domain jurisprudence.69

763 (Minn. 1986) (citing Poletown and concluding that “revitalization of deteriorating urban areas and the
alleviation of unemployment are certainly public goals”).
61
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
62
See Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1349, 1354 (1982) (“[T]he arguments deployed [in Poletown] in support of the publicness of this venture
could be deployed in support of virtually any venture imaginable . . . .”); Susan Crabtree, Note, Public Use
in Eminent Domain: Are There Limits After Oakland Raiders and Poletown?, 20 CAL. W. L. REV. 82, 103
(1983) (“Equating mere public benefit with public use has effectively destroyed public use as a restraint on
eminent domain.”).
63
See Ga. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jasper County, 586 S.E.2d 853, 856 (S.C. 2003) (“[P]ower of eminent
domain cannot be used to accomplish a project simply because it will benefit the public.”); Southwestern
Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat’l City Environmental, LLC, 768 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2002) (“[T]o constitute a public use,
something more than a mere benefit to the public must flow from the contemplated improvement.”)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Mfg. Housing Comm. v. State, 13 P.3d 183, 196 (Wash.
2000) (en banc) (“[T]he use under consideration must be either a use by the public, or by some agency
which is quasi public, and not simply a use which may incidentally or indirectly promote the public interest
or general prosperity of the state.”).
64
See Ga. Dep’t of Transp., 586 S.E.2d at 856 (“‘public purpose’ discussed in [tax] cases is not the same
as a ‘public use’”); Southwestern Ill. Dev. Auth., 768 N.E.2d at 8 (“a distinction still exists and is essential
to this case”); Mfg. Housing Comm., 13 P.3d at 189 (“these terms are not synonymous”).
65
684 N.W. 2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
66
Id. at 786-87.
67
See id. at 769-70.
68
Id.; see also id. (characterizing private economic development as a public use would “render impotent
our constitutional limitations on the government’s power of eminent domain”).
69
See Mary Massaron Ross, Public Use: Does County of Wayne v. Hathcock Signal a Revival of the
Public Use Limit to the Taking of Private Property?, 37 URB. LAW. 243, 247-48 (2005) (asserting that “the
recent decision in County of Wayne v. Hathcock reflects a trend toward increased review of governmental
takings when the property is to be given over to private use”); NICHOLS § 7.06[28] (noting that “the
reversal of the Poletown decision may signal a trend towards heightened scrutiny of what constitutes a
‘public use’”).
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C. Kelo v. City of New London
The opportunity for the U.S. Supreme Court to reexamine the public use
requirement came in Kelo v. City of New London.70 In Kelo, New London delegated its
eminent domain authority to a private economic development corporation charged with
revitalizing the downtown and waterfront areas of the city. The development corporation
decided to remove over ninety existing homes and small businesses in order to replace
them with privately-owned office buildings and a riverfront hotel that would complement
a new Pfizer global research facility. After seven property owners refused to sell, the
development corporation took title to the land through eminent domain. City authorities
argued that the condemnations were justified because the city had endured three decades
of economic decline, including the recent loss of 1,900 government jobs, and had no
other viable options for increasing its tax base to help pay for schools and services.71
Writing for the Court in a five-to-four decision, Justice Stevens held that the city’s
use of eminent domain to transfer property from one private owner to another for the
purpose of economic development constituted a legitimate public use under the Fifth
Amendment.72 The Court based its conclusion on two lines of cases. First, relying on
Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley,73 the Court continued to define public use
broadly by equating public use with public purpose.74 Second, relying on Berman and
Midkiff, the Court continued to defer to legislative determinations of public use.75 The
Court, quoting Midkiff, reiterated that “[w]hen the legislature’s purpose is legitimate and
its means are not irrational, our cases make clear that empirical debates over the wisdom
of takings—no less than debates over the wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic
legislation—are not to be carried out in the federal courts.”76 As a result, the Court
concluded that the potential for increased jobs and tax revenue incidental to private
development satisfied the public use requirement.77
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy suggested that his agreement with the
majority in this case did not “foreclose the possibility that a more stringent standard of
review . . . might be appropriate” for private transfers with a higher “risk of undetected
impermissible favoritism of private parties.”78 However, Justice Kennedy concluded that
this case did not entail the “impermissible favoritism of private parties” because the
primary motivation of these takings was not for the private benefit of Pfizer and because
the condemnations were part of a “comprehensive development plan.”79
70

545 U.S. __, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005).
See id. at 2658-60.
72
See id. at 2665 (concluding that that “[p]romoting economic development is a traditional and long
accepted function of government.”).
73
164 U.S. 112 (1896).
74
See Kelo, 545 U.S. __, 125 S.Ct. at 2663 (concluding that “[w]ithout exception, our cases have defined
that concept broadly”).
75
See id. (describing the Court’s “longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in this
field”).
76
Id. (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242).
77
See id. at 2665 (concluding that “an economic development plan that [the City] believes will provide
appreciable benefits to the community, including—but by no means limited to—new jobs and increased tax
revenue . . . unquestionably serves a public purpose”).
78
Id. at 2670 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
79
Id.
71
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In contrast, in two dissenting opinions, Justices O’Connor and Thomas argued
that, under the majority’s interpretation, almost any private property is now vulnerable to
the use of eminent domain for a more productive private project.80 Justice O’Connor (on
behalf of four dissenters) contended that, while previous decisions such as Berman had
focused on some “harmful property use,” the majority had expanded the meaning of
public use.81 She noted that, under the majority’s interpretation, the state could now
transfer property from one private use to another “so long as the new use is predicted to
generate some secondary benefit for the public—such as increased tax revenue, more
jobs, maybe even aesthetic pleasure.”82 Similarly, Justice Thomas argued that the
majority’s opinion provided no principled line for judicial decisionmaking.83
Justice Stevens defended the Court’s holding by asserting that the Public Use
Clause retained meaning. He noted that “transferring citizen A’s property to citizen B for
the sole reason that citizen B will put the property to a more productive use and thus pay
more taxes . . . would certainly raise a suspicion that a private purpose was afoot.” 84 The
Court, however, did not provide any standard for defining public use or distinguishing
between purported public uses (as in Kelo) and potential private uses (as in the
hypothetical transfer from citizen A to citizen B).85
III. A RATIONALE FOR THE PUBLIC USE REQUIREMENT
A. Secret Purchases
1. Circumventing the Holdout Problem
According to the conventional justification for eminent domain, private parties, as
well as the government, need this power to overcome the holdout problem among
strategically-acting sellers.86 This insight regarding the holdout problem was widely
recognized even prior to the modern law-and-economics movement.87 Contemporary

80

See Kelo, 545 U.S. __, 125 S.Ct. at 2671 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Under the banner of economic
development, all private property is now vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another private owner,
so long as it might be upgraded—i.e., given to an owner who will use it in a way that the legislature deems
more beneficial to the public—in the process.”); id. at 2678 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“If such ‘economic
development’ takings are for a ‘public use,’ any taking is, and the Court has erased the Public Use Clause
from our Constitution . . . .”).
81
Id. at 2675 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
82
Id.
83
See id. at 2683 (Thomas, J., dissenting ) (arguing that the majority’s application of Berman and Midkiff
is “further proof that the ‘public purpose’ standard is not susceptible of principled application”).
84
Id. at 2666-67 & n.17 (citing 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp.
2d 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2001)).
85
See id. at 2667 (arguing that “the hypothetical cases posited by petitioners can be confronted if and
when they arise” and “do not warrant the crafting of an artificial restriction on the concept of public use”).
86
See supra note 15.
87
See, e.g., Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371 (1876) (“If the right to acquire property for such uses
may be made a barren right by the unwillingness of property-holders to sell, . . . the constitutional grants of
power may be rendered nugatory, and the government is dependent for its practical existence upon . . . that
of a private citizen.”); Everett W. Cox Co. v. State Highway Commission, 133 A. 419, 513 (N.J. 1926) (“In
order to effect the purpose of the act for the building of state highways, the exercise of the power of
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courts also have identified the holdout problem as the primary justification for the state’s
use of eminent domain.88
The holdout problem may occur in cases involving the assembly of multiple
properties because of the strategic behavior of potential sellers. The existing owners,
knowing that their individual properties are each necessary for the assembler to complete
the entire project, can “hold out” in order to obtain a higher price. According to one
commentator:
Without an exercise of eminent domain, . . . [e]ach owner would have the
power to hold out, should he choose to exercise it. If even a few owners
held out, others might do the same. In this way, assembly of the needed
parcels could become prohibitively expensive; in the end, the costs might
well exceed the project’s potential gains.89
Indeed, this type of strategic behavior among sellers could prevent the entire project from
occurring. 90 The primary advantage of eminent domain, therefore, is the state’s ability to
avoid these holdout problems and simply appropriate property.91
Most commentators and courts have assumed that this holdout rationale applies
equally to both takings for the government and takings for private parties.92 However,
takings for private parties are usually unnecessary because private parties do not face the
holdout problem. Specifically, private parties can avoid the holdout problem by
employing secret buying agents, which provide not only an alternative but also a superior

eminent domain is absolutely necessary. If this were not the law, then a single individual could hold up a
state project.”).
88
See, e.g., Diginet, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 958 F.2d 1388, 1400 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that “hold-up
potential is the principal argument for investing right of way companies with the power of eminent
domain”); Aaron v. Target Corp., 269 F.Supp.2d 1162, 1177 (E.D. Mo. 2003) (“Eminent domain can . . . be
an effective tool against free-riders who hold-out for exorbitant prices when private developers are
attempting to assemble parcels for public places . . . .”); Cottonwood Christian Center v. Cypress
Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1231 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (same). Justice Souter conveyed
essentially the same point during oral argument in Kelo v. City of New London. See Transcript of Oral
Argument at 15, 545 U.S. __, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/04-108.pdf (“[T]he rationale for this
is essentially the rationale for the railroads, for the public utility line condemnations, and so on: there isn’t
another practical way to do it.”).
89
Merrill, supra note 18, at 74-75.
90
See Patricia Munch, An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain, 84 J. POL. ECON. 473, 474 (1976)
(“Consolidation of many contiguous but separately owned parcels of land under one owner supposedly
creates a holdout problem, with each seller having an incentive to hold out to be the last to settle and
capture any rent accruing to the assembly.”).
91
See SHAVELL, supra note 17, at 126 (“[T]he problems in bargaining that can prevent or delay
consummation of purchase of property are avoided when the state can appropriate property. If the state
wants to assemble land to build a road, it can simply take the land; it need not bargain with the many
owners to acquire the land and face delay or unwillingness to sell. This is a primary advantage of the use
of eminent domain over acquisition by purchase.”).
92
See, e.g., Richard Posner, “The Kelo Case, Public Use, and Eminent Domain,” The Becker-Posner
Blog, available at http://becker-posner-blog.com/ (June 26, 2005) (“[T]he rationale for eminent domain is
unrelated to whether the party exercising the eminent domain power is the government or a private firm.”).
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mechanism for enabling socially desirable transfers.93 As a result, private parties do not
need the state’s power of eminent domain.94
Private parties—including not only Harvard and Disney but also smaller urban
developers—already utilize buying agents on a regular basis. Harvard University,
working through a real estate development company, used secret buying agents to
purchase fourteen separate parcels for $88 million.95 One Harvard official, arguing that it
is normal for nonprofit organizations to conceal their role in real estate transactions to
prevent excessively high prices, stated that “[w]e were really driven by the need to get
these properties at fair market value’ and avoid ‘overly inflated acquisition costs.’”96 The
University pointed out that “the use of an intermediary is a common practice in real estate
deals.”97
Likewise, Disney used secret agents in Orlando, Florida and Manassas, Virginia
to avoid the holdout problem and assemble thousands of acres for its theme parks.98 In
Orlando, buying agents “quietly negotiated one deal after another—sometimes lining up
contracts to buy huge tracts for little more than $100 an acre.”99 Similarly, in Manassas,
Disney “amassed about 3,000 acres for a proposed theme park in Northern Virginia” by
“[c]reating a network of dummy companies that included agents from two other law
firms” and “conclud[ing] as secretly as possible 11 separate deals, ranging in size from
one acre to 1,800 acres.”100 Disney’s overriding concern in using secret agents was to
overcome potential strategic behavior among sellers.101
Moreover, several courts have pointed out that the use of secret buying agents is a
“common arms-length business practice” among shopping center developers and other
real estate purchasers.102 Indeed, in overruling Poletown, the Michigan Supreme Court
93

See Munch, supra note 90, 479 (explaining that “[i]f holdout behavior is anticipated” private parties
will incur “[e]xpenditure[s] on devices to circumvent or eliminate the incentive to hold out . . . includ[ing]
concealment of the identity of the buyer, the purpose and extent of the planned assembly and prices paid for
parcels, and the use of brokers”).
94
Cf. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53
U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 750 (1986) (“The law of eminent domain often reflects this anti-holdout rationale by
confining the power to situations where holdout is a genuine threat.”).
95
See Marcella Bombardieri, Summers Boost Allston Plan; Harvard President Says Growth is Key,
BOSTON GLOBE, October 22, 2003, at A1; Tina Cassidy & Don Aucoin, Harvard Reveals Secret Purchases
of 52 Acres Worth $88 Million in Allston, BOSTON GLOBE, June 10, 1997, at A1.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
See Alvin A. Arnold, Development: How the Site Assembler Operates, MORTGAGE AND REAL ESTATE
EXECUTIVES REPORT, Feb. 15, 1995, at 6 (describing Disney’s assembly of land in Orlando as a “classic
example”); David S. Hilzenrath, Disney’s Land of Make Believe: Acquisition Agent Used Ruse to Prevent
Real Estate Speculation, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1993, at A1 (detailing Disney’s “stealth approach”).
99
Mark Andrews, Disney Assembled Cast of Buyers To Amass Land Stage for Kingdom, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, May 30, 1993, at K2.
100
Tim O’Reiley, Playing Secret Agent for Mickey Mouse; Lawyers Ran Dummy Corporations, Bought
Real Estate for Disney, LEGAL TIMES (Washington, D.C.), Jan. 10, 1994, at 2.
101
Indeed, the legal director for Walt Disney Co. noted that, “[i]f people think it is Disney, then the price
goes up. Or if people think there is an assemblage of land, that will drive up the price as well.” Id.
102
Westgate Village Shopping Center v. Lion Dry Goods Co., 21 F.3d 429 (Table), 1994 WL 108959,
No. 93-3760, at 7 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating that the use of secret buying agents in development plans for
shopping centers is “a common arms-length business practice that has to do with keeping real estate prices
from escalating”).
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noted that “the landscape of our country is flecked with shopping centers, office parks,
clusters of hotels, and centers of entertainment and commerce” which did not “require[]
the exercise of eminent domain or any other form of collective public action for their
formation.”103 The Court described how shopping centers and other large-scale
commercial projects “creat[e] various facades behind which they can hide” in order to
overcome the holdout problem and assemble multiple parcels of land at reasonable
acquisition prices.104
Secret buying agents also have been successful in aggregating land in urban and
metropolitan areas—usually among the most difficult places to assembly property. In
Las Vegas, for example, a real estate group “acquired 2,400 acres of land (consisting
mostly of parcels of five acres or less) in order to build a master-planned community.”105
In Providence, a development group “assembled 21 separate parcels of land . . . to
construct a 1.4 million-square-foot mall with space for 160 shops.”106 And in West Palm
Beach, two developers, using twenty different brokers, secretly “purchas[ed] over 300
separate parcels from 240 different landowners in nine months” to assemble twenty-six
contiguous downtown blocks.107
Buying agents are able to circumvent the holdout problem using a double-blind
acquisition system. First, existing owners do not realize that buying agents are
attempting to purchase their properties for a larger project. These owners will thus have
no incentive or ability to inflate their asking prices and will sell if the offer price exceeds
their valuation of the property. Second, the buying agents themselves usually do not
know that they are attempting to purchase the property for a larger project. The agents
themselves thus have no incentive or ability to assist existing owners in holding out for a
higher price. Secret buying agents thus fulfill one commentator’s prediction that—as in
other areas of the law—“there is no a priori reason to believe that the marketplace is
incapable of crafting private-order solutions to the problem of holdouts.”108
2. Enabling Socially Desirable Transfers
While both eminent domain and secret buying agents are capable of
circumventing the holdout problem, eminent domain—unlike secret buying agents—
sometimes causes socially undesirable transfers. Eminent domain may force a transfer
where the existing owners actually value the land more than the private assembler.
103

684 N.W. 2d 765, 783-84 (Mich. 2004).
Id.
105
Brief Amicus Curiae of John Norquist, President, Congress for New Urbanism in Support of
Petitioners, at *5, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. __, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108).
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Id. at 5-6.
107
Id. at 6.
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Donald J. Kochan, “Public Use” and the Independent Judiciary: Condemnation in an Interest-Group
Perspective, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 49, 88 (1998). In corporate law, for example, private purchasers use
tender offers to overcome the holdout problem. See id. (citing J. Gregory Sidack & Susan E. Woodward,
Takeover Premiums, Appraisal Rights and the Price Elasticity of a Firm’s Publicly Traded Stock, 25 GA.
L. REV. 783, 801-05 (1991)) (noting that the tender offer is “an innovation in corporate law designed to
overcome the holdout problem associated with control transactions); id. at 89 (concluding that “corporate
law is empirical proof that the holdout problem can be overcome without governmental intervention”); see
also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 14.9, at 390 (3d ed. 1986) (describing tender
offers as a type of “private eminent domain”).
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Buying agents, by contrast, eliminate this risk of erroneous condemnations through
voluntary transactions, which ensure that every transfer is mutually beneficial (and thus
socially desirable).
The United States Supreme Court has long-recognized that there is no practicable
mechanism for determining how much existing owners actually (i.e., subjectively) value
their property.109 The actual or subjective value of an owner’s property includes the
personal values that an owner attaches to the land, including sentimental and
idiosyncratic value.110 These personal values, however, are difficult to quantify.111
Moreover, self-valuations are also impracticable because, in response to the
government’s offer to purchase or a just compensation determination, existing owners
have an incentive to inflate their selling prices opportunistically in order to augment their
own compensation.112 Because personal values are difficult to quantify and because selfvaluations would lead to overstatements, actual value in the context of a threatened
condemnation is difficult (if not impossible) to calculate.
As a result, in calculating just compensation for any taking, courts ignore the
subjective values of existing landowners.113 Instead, courts rely on the “fair market
value,” an “objective” measure of damages.114 But under the fair market value standard,
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See United States v. 546.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) (noting the “serious practical
difficulties in assessing the worth [of] particular property at a given time”); Kimball Laundry Co. v. United
States, 338 U.S. 1 , 6 (1949) (stating that “since a transfer brought about by eminent domain is not a
voluntary exchange, this amount can be determined only by a guess”); Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403,
408 (1878) (concluding “that it is perhaps impossible to formulate a rule to govern its appraisement in all
cases”).
110
See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 569
(2005) (“[E]ven where the object has close substitutes, the development of habit and familiarity, or
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Donald L. Beschle, The Supreme Court’s IOLTA Decision, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 846, 891 (2000)
(pointing out “the enormous difficulties that would flow from allowing compensation for subjective or
‘personhood’ losses”); Lawrence V. Berkovich, To Pay or to Convey?: A Theory of Remedies for Breach of
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Amendment, 90 HARV. L. REV. 596, 598 (1977) [hereinafter Valuation] (pointing out the “evidentiary
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See Tung Yin, Reviving Fallen Copyrights, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 383, 406-07 (1997) (“[T]he use of
subjective value is subject to moral hazard: Property owners have an incentive to present an inflated
subjective value.”); see also Chicago and North Western Trans. Co. v. United States, 678 F.2d 665, 669
(7th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he condemnee who asks for more than what the property would have been worth to
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having to pay.”).
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See Rachel Croson & Jason Scott Johnston, Experimental Results on Bargaining Under Alternative
Property Rights Regimes, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 50. 53-54 (2000) (“Courts typically do not even attempt to
discern and compensate for subjective losses above market values.”); Valuation, supra note 111, at 598
(noting that courts “exclude[] from consideration what may be termed idiosyncratic value to the
condemnee”); see also Glen O. Robinson, On Refusing to Deal With Rivals, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1177,
1994 (2002) (“By assumption, subjective value has no reliably objective measure, which is the
conventional justification for excluding it from eminent domain compensation.”).
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See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) (stating that the Court has
“employed the concept of fair market value to determine the condemnee’s loss” because of the “need for a
relatively objective working rule”) (citations omitted); Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions,
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a property’s value is not determined in the market. Rather, the existing owner is “entitled
to receive ‘what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller’ at the time of the
taking.”115 This judicially-determined market value, however, neither calculates nor
compensates a taking’s full costs,116 including demoralization costs.117 Courts thus
systemically underestimate the value of land to existing owners.118
Consequently, whenever the state appropriates land through eminent domain,
instead of through voluntary exchange, a socially undesirable transaction is possible.
Indeed, a socially undesirable taking may occur whenever the actual value deviates from
the “market” value. If the state underestimates the private value of the property to the
current owner, the state may erroneously appropriate the property from its highest-valued
user. That is, whenever the private value to the existing owners is greater than the private
value of the property to the assembler but the government mistakenly believes that the
value to the assembler is greater than the value to the existing owners, the use of eminent
domain could cause a socially undesirable transfer.119
Using eminent domain for private transfers may also cause socially undesirable
transactions for another reason. In addition to underestimating the costs of the taking to
existing owners, private parties (and the government) sometimes overestimate a project’s

State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 62 (1987) (“Because [subjective value] is
difficult to determine, courts have moved to the market value standard.”).
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564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. at 511 (quoting United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943)).
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Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for Regulatory Takings, 99
NW. U. L. REV. 677, 678-79 (2005) (“Despite courts’ admonition that just compensation should place an
owner in the position she would have occupied but for the governmental action, current compensation rules
exclude whole categories of damages caused by government takings of private property.”); Steven J. Eagle,
Privatizing Urban Land Use Regulation: The Problem of Consent, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 905, 915 (1999)
(“[G]iven that the destruction of subjective value almost always occurs in eminent domain proceedings,
‘just compensation’ is hardly ever ‘full compensation.’”); Steven M. Crafton, Comment, Taking the
Oakland Raiders,: A Theoretical Reconsideration of the Concepts of Public Use and Just Compensation,
32 EMORY L.J. 857, 890 (1983) (“Because a condemnee, by definition, is an unwilling seller, payment of
market value will not compensate the person for the loss.”).
117
See Fischel, supra note 35, at 932 (“Unlike impersonal forces such as markets and the weather,
governmental actions that take or devalue private property impose on owners and their sympathizers a
special disutility, which Frank Michelman identified as ‘demoralization cost.’” (citing Frank I. Michelman,
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of ‘Just Compensation’ Law, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1967))); Heller & Krier, supra note 4, at 1001 (“Demoralization has to figure
into the calculation of final costs and benefits, and thus into the question whether a government program
enhances or diminishes net welfare.”).
118
See Croson & Johnston, supra note 113, at 68 (noting “the assumption that the court does not attempt
to discern or compensate for subjective value, and therefore both overcompensates and undercompensates
systematically”); Crafton, supra note 116, at 891 n.186 (noting that, “[i]n the case of an unwilling seller,
the market price will undercompensate the seller by the amount of the difference between his subjective
reservation price and the condemnation price”); see also Coniston Corp. v. Vill. Of Hoffman Estates, 844
F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Compensation [for takings] in the constitutional sense is therefore not full
compensation, for market value is not the value that every owner of property attaches to his property but
merely the value that the marginal owner attaches to his property.”).
119
See SHAVELL, supra note 17, at 126 (“The possibility of undesirable state acquisition of property
arises when it has eminent domain powers but not when it must acquire property through purchase. The
state might underestimate the private value of property and take it when its true private value exceeds its
value to the public.”)
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expected benefits.120 Private parties may overestimate expected benefits because such
determinations are often speculative and difficult to predict. Private parties also may
intentionally exaggerate the benefits of a taking for the purpose of obtaining the state’s
condemnation authority.121 And these private parties may do so in situations in which
they would not have exaggerated the benefits were they attempting to buy the property
through voluntary exchange. In Poletown, for example, the City of Detroit and General
Motors dramatically overestimated the number of jobs that the new plant would create.122
Whether overestimating occurs because expected benefits are difficult to predict or
because of intentional exaggeration, erroneous valuations of expected benefits also cause
socially undesirable transfers.
In contrast, using secret buying agents eliminates the risk that the state will
condemn property mistakenly. Voluntary transactions ensure that only mutually
beneficial transfers occur.123 Unlike the use of eminent domain, voluntary exchange
using buying agents allows the existing owners’ subjective value to be taken into account.
At the same time, using buying agents prevents existing owners from strategically
inflating their valuations.124 Because both parties will bear their expected costs and
expected benefits themselves, their private incentives will be consistent with the optimal
social incentives. By both overcoming the holdout problem and eliminating the risk of
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(June 26, 2005) (“[Eminent domain] allows governments to avoid the market test of whether a proposed
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erroneous condemnations, secret buying agents provide a superior—not only
alternative—mechanism to eminent domain.
3. Distinguishing Governmental Takings
Secret buying agents also provide a reason for distinguishing between
constitutional public uses and unconstitutional private uses. Unlike private parties, the
government usually cannot use secret buying agents to acquire property for its own
projects. These projects are almost always subject to the transparency of democratic
deliberations and the scrutiny of the local community. While private parties can choose
not to disclose their projects, governmental projects are subject to public accountability
and thus publicly known in advance.125 As a result, the government—unlike private
parties—needs eminent domain to overcome the holdout problem for its own projects.
For example, suppose that a city wishes to construct a new public airport to
improve transportation. If the city seeks to build the airport near a major metropolitan
area, the project will require the assembly of multiple parcels from existing owners.
However, the state would be unable to acquire these parcels using secret buying agents.
The consideration, approval, and construction of an airport (like most governmental
projects) requires public scrutiny and various regulatory approvals. In selecting a site, for
instance, the state and city officials would have to consult with the various airlines, the
affected neighborhoods, and regulatory agencies such as the Federal Aviation
Administration. As a result, maintaining the secrecy the new airport would be virtually
impossible.
In certain limited situations, the government might be able to acquire property
through buying agents. For example, if the government seeks to assemble property for a
military base, the implementation of the project or the location of the land might remain
classified. Other factors, however, provide additional countervailing reasons for why
eminent domain is necessary for the government but unnecessary for private parties. For
example, even if the government was able to keep secrets, the combination of secret land
acquisitions and the need to buy off holdouts raises a significant danger of corruption
between governmental officials and existing owners.126 As one commentator has
explained:
One can easily imagine government officials charged with engaging in
secret land assembly tipping off potential sellers about a project, or buying
off sellers at exorbitant prices in return for kickbacks. It is one thing for
private developers to decide when to buy off a holdout and at what price.
It is quite another, when a government purchasing agent, spending
taxpayers’ money, makes these decisions without public oversight. To
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Id.
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avoid this specter of corruption, government may have to use eminent
domain under circumstances where a private developer, with his own
money and guile, could use the market.
Overall, therefore, the clear benefits of democratic deliberation (as well as the justified
skepticism of secret governmental projects) militate strongly in favor of the government’s
using eminent domain rather than secret purchases.
Secret buying agents thus provide a reason for distinguishing between
constitutional public uses (where secret buying agents are ineffective and thus eminent
domain is necessary) and unconstitutional private uses (where secret buying agents are
effective and thus eminent domain is unnecessary). While other commentators, as well
as a few courts, have noted that secret buying agents sometimes allow private parties to
assemble property,127 this idea has remained relatively undeveloped. Yet because secret
buying agents allow private parties—but not the government—to overcome the holdout
problem and assemble property, secret purchases distinguish those circumstances in
which eminent domain is necessary and beneficial (and thus provides a “public use”)
from those circumstances in which eminent domain is unnecessary or detrimental (and
thus provides no “public use”).
B. Inordinate Private Influence
1. The Concentrated Benefit Problem
The use of eminent domain to transfer property from one private owner to another
should also be disfavored because it increases the potential for inordinate private
influence. Private parties that would directly benefit from takings have a strong incentive
to influence the eminent domain process for their own private advantage. Indeed,
because private parties can use eminent domain to obtain a relatively concentrated
benefit, these parties have an incentive to use inordinate influence to achieve their private
objectives through condemnations. Thus, not only is the right to take property
unnecessary for private developers (who can use secret buying agents to circumvent the
holdout problem), but giving private parties access to eminent domain leads to
manipulation of the process and socially undesirable takings.
In a taking primarily for a private benefit (e.g., the assembly of land for a real
estate development), the single beneficiary (e.g., a corporation, casino, or developer) has
a powerful incentive to capture a concentrated benefit. By contrast, in a taking primarily
for the general public (e.g., the acquisition of land for a new highway), the taking
involves multiple beneficiaries (i.e., all of the future commuters). Because these multiple
beneficiaries are more numerous and more dispersed, they have less of an incentive and
less of an ability to subvert the eminent domain process through inordinate influence.
The potential for corruption is thus higher in a taking for a private party (which involves
a single concentrated beneficiary) than a taking for the government (which involves
multiple, dispersed beneficiaries).128
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Moreover, while the private party can use inordinate influence to obtain a
concentrated benefit, the costs of the taking will be relatively dispersed among affected
property owners. As a result, the incentives to oppose the taking will be relatively
attenuated.
While condemnees do not receive full compensation, even partial
compensation decreases their individual incentives to oppose a taking.129 And an
assembly project that involves multiple owners also creates a coordination problem
because individual owners will free ride off of the other affected owners. Overall,
therefore, private parties seeking a concentrated benefit are capable of using eminent
domain to exploit bargaining and free rider problems among existing owners.
Furthermore, the political check against the private use of eminent domain is
relatively ineffective for several reasons. First, as Justice Marshall noted, the time lag,
which often entails several years, between the time of the condemnation and the time at
which the consequences of the condemnation will be known may undermine political
accountability.130 Second, because the costs of the just compensation associated with the
taking are dispersed among all taxpayers,131 taxpayers have neither a sufficient incentive
nor the relevant information to oppose particular condemnations for private parties.132
Third, as a repeat player within the legislature, private parties, unlike dispersed
landowners, enjoy a substantial advantage in the political process.133 Fourth, private
the investment does not exceed the benefit they will obtain.”); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public
Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
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has any one key finding, it is that small groups with high stakes have a disproportionately great influence
on the political process.”).
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thereby decreases his incentive to invest in fighting the condemnation.” (citing Farber, supra note 128, at
289-91 (1992))).
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131
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development agencies—rather than the legislature—often retain the actual eminent
domain authority, but such agencies are not democratically accountable.134 As a result,
the political process usually will be unable to compensate for the inordinate influence that
private parties exert in seeking the condemnation authority for their own advantage.135
In this way, private parties seeking to utilize eminent domain to obtain a
concentrated benefit may subvert the process for their own advantage. Because of the
substantial potential benefit, these parties have a socially perverse incentive to pursue
profit-maximizing opportunities that may not be in the public interest. In contrast,
private entities are less likely to capture the political process when the government uses
the power of eminent domain for a project that benefits dispersed members of the public.
Therefore, because of this greater potential for inordinate private influence, the use of
eminent domain should be disfavored for private objectives.
2. The Costless Acquisition Problem
A second problem with private influence occurs because private parties usually
are not required to pay any compensation to either the condemnees or the state when
eminent domain is used on their behalf. In Kelo, for example, the private beneficiary of
the state’s use of eminent domain negotiated a ninety-nine year lease with the
redevelopment corporation for one dollar per year.136 Likewise, in Cousins Island,
Maine, the state seized a parking lot near a ferry landing from one private owner and
leased the lot to the ferry owner for the same use for one dollar per year.137 In Corona,
California, the city promised to acquire and sell four parcels of land for one dollar to a
developer, who would also receive one million dollars in tax rebates.138

134
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Because private developers can benefit from the state’s use of eminent domain
without bearing any of the costs, developers will use the takings power excessively in
pursuing their objectives. When a private party is not required to pay the full costs of a
good, the party will consume too high a quantity of the good (in this case, land). Private
developers thus have the potential for a windfall gain without paying any of the attendant
costs. As a result, these entities have a socially perverse incentive to capture the eminent
domain process for their own advantage. And these developers may have this incentive
even while they may not have sought or acquired the land if they were required to pay the
actual value through consensual transactions (or even the “market” value through just
compensation).
The ability of private developers to acquire property costlessly also causes an
additional problem. Costless acquisition gives developers an incentive to “back out” of
transactions after condemnations have already occurred if the circumstances have
changed.139 Unlike normal purchasers, private developers who benefit from eminent
domain usually are not required to commit to a project until after the existing properties
have been condemned and demolished. If a private developer initially overestimates
expected benefits (or a more attractive opportunity later arises), the private developer can
decide to forego the project because the state—rather than the developer—has expended
the resources necessary to acquire the property. Thus, a developer who is not required to
make the initial investment (either in buying the property or in using secret agents to buy
the property) is more likely to abandon an ongoing project before completion.140
Thus, the ability of a private developer to acquire and assemble land without
incurring any costs leads to both an excessive number of takings and to the possibility
that a developer will “back out” after a project has already been commenced. The
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costless acquisition of property for a developer through the state’s use of eminent domain
thus leads to an additional form of corruption. Because private developers can use
eminent domain to achieve a concentrated benefit and because they can do so without
incurring any costs, they will have a strong incentive to use almost any means (including
intensive lobbying, political contributions, expensive lawyers, threats to relocate, and
sometimes even bribery) to obtain the takings power for their own private objectives.
3. The Resource Disparity Problem
The third form of inordinate influence involves the private manipulation of the
eminent domain process by exploiting disparities in legal and financial resources. Private
parties often prefer to overcome the holdout problem through eminent domain rather than
through private bargaining using buying agents.141 Local government is especially
susceptible to the resources of affluent private developers who promise more jobs and tax
revenue.142 As a result, private entities often use their superior legal sophistication and
financial resources to co-opt the eminent domain process—an authority intended for the
public interest—for their own private advantage. Thus, allowing private parties to use
the state’s power of eminent domain systematically advantages large market players
(including real estate and condominium developers, corporations, and large
entertainments facilities such as casinos and sports stadiums) over existing owners with
fewer financial and legal resources (including low-income and working class
homeowners, the elderly, local stores and small businesses, houses of worship, and racial
and ethnic minorities).143
The history of eminent domain also shows a pattern of invidious discrimination
against racial and ethnic minorities.144 According to one commentator, “the displacement
of African-Americans and urban renewal projects were so intertwined that ‘urban
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renewal’ was often referred to as ‘Negro removal.’”145 Moreover, eminent domain
imposes a disproportionate impact on racial and ethnic minorities, as well as the
economically disadvantaged and elderly.146 Indeed, in their brief supporting the
petitioners in Kelo, several civil rights organizations pointed out that “the economically
disadvantaged and, in particular, racial and ethnic minorities and the elderly . . . have
been targeted for the use and abuse of the eminent domain power in the past and there is
evidence that . . . these groups will be both disproportionately and specially harmed by
the exercise of that expanded power.”147
Disparities in legal and financial resources also may cause quid pro quo
corruption, which occurs between local officials and private developers.148 In such an
arrangement, the benefit to the private developer is the ability to obtain and assemble
land without purchasing the property for the full price.149 On the other hand, the
motivations of the local authorities for engaging in quid pro quo corruption may be either
benevolent or malevolent: benevolent if the authorities subjectively believe the taking
will improve the local community; malevolent if the authorities are pursuing their own
self-interest (e.g., with side payments, bribes, kickbacks, or campaign contributions)
rather than the public interest.150
Disparities in legal and financial resources thus create the opportunity for the
private exploitation of the economically disadvantaged and politically disfavored. These
disparities in resources, coupled with the perverse incentives of private developers
seeking a concentrated benefit with minimal acquisition costs, indicate that the use of the
takings power for private parties often leads to misuse of the process. Thus, for two
reasons—the superiority of secret buying agents and the increased potential for
corruption—the eminent domain power should generally not be used on behalf of private
parties. In contrast, the state’s inability to use secret buying agents and the diminished
possibility of inordinate private influence indicate that eminent domain is both necessary
and appropriate for the government. The new theory based on secret purchases and
private influence thus provides a principle for interpreting the public use requirement and
distinguishing between public and private uses.
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C. Counterarguments
1. Positive Externalities
As discussed above, secret buying agents facilitate consensual purchases of land if
a transfer is socially desirable—i.e., if the value of the properties to the private assembler
is greater than the value of the properties to the existing owners.151 Conversely, if the
value of the project to the assembler is less than the value of the properties to the existing
owners, no transaction will occur. However, a situation could arise in which the private
benefit of the taking is lower than the actual value of the properties to all of the existing
owners, but the social benefit of the taking is greater than the actual value to the existing
owners. That is, in certain situations a private benefit may not be large enough to induce
a private party to assemble property even though a positive externality makes the project
socially desirable.
Suppose, for example, that a private party wanted to assemble ten parcels of land
that had a total value to the party of $15 million when assembled. Suppose also that the
value to the ten existing owners of the ten parcels was $1 million per parcel or $10
million overall. With secret buying agents, the private party wouldpurchase the property
because the value to the assembler ($15 million) is greater than the value to the existing
owners ($10 million). However, suppose that the assembly contains a positive externality
such that the private value that the assembler could internalize is only $9 million while
the overall social value is $15 million. In this situation, the private benefit would not be
large enough to induce the assembler to purchase the property—even using secret
agents—because the benefit to the assembler ($9 million) is less than the value to the
existing owners ($10 million). That is, the existence of a substantial positive externality
prevents a socially desirable assembly from occurring even with secret buying agents.
Historically, the Mill Acts, which allowed private parties to condemn and flood
riparian lands to provide for grist-mills,152 illustrate the advantage of using eminent
domain where a substantial externality exists. The justification for the condemnation
authority of the Mill Acts—like the justification for eminent domain generally—was to
provide a mechanism for overcoming the holdout problem.153 But the Mill Acts provided
all members of society with a vital public benefit—indeed, a “necessity”154—that
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otherwise could not have been obtained. As a result, the United States Supreme Court
upheld condemnations under the Mill Acts as legitimate public uses.155 Thus, certain
activities, like the maintenance of functioning grist-mills in colonial America, may
produce a positive externality so significant that eminent domain may be necessary to
supplement private incentives and ensure that these transactions occur.156
However, the exception for positive externalities should be limited for several
reasons. First, if the private benefits of a project are insufficient to induce private parties
to assemble the land, a public subsidy may be possible to provide a sufficient incentive to
assemble the property. The government may subsidize any project (including the
assembly of land through secret agents) if the government determines that the project
involves a distinct positive externality. While a public subsidy is a common solution to
this type of externality,157 such a subsidy may not be feasible ext ante while maintaining
the anonymity of secret buying agents. However, such a subsidy could be given ex post
without affecting the ability of secret agents to overcome the holdout problem. In this
way, secret purchases remain possible even with the subsidies that may be necessary to
supplement private incentives if an externality exists.
Second, even without the possibility of an ex post subsidy, eminent domain
should not be used on behalf of private parties without a positive externality of a
magnitude that is likely to create a significant difference in the private and social
incentives for assembling the property. If there is not a substantial externality associated
with the private transaction, then private bargaining (using secret buying agents) would
produce the optimal result. While negotiations between secret buying agents and existing
owners may fail, these types of bargaining problems exist with any market transaction.158
Courts, as well as legislatures, generally do not have enough information to interfere with
such bargaining. As a result, they should not permit the private use of eminent domain
unless the transaction involves a significant positive externality.
Third, the exception for externalities should also be limited because the definition
of “externality” is relatively amorphous.159 Virtually any development might be said to
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be able to benefit the community.160 However, a private party’s providing additional jobs
or tax revenue does not constitute a positive externality, unless the jobs have some
incidental effect on social welfare.161 A positive externality can only justify the private
use of eminent domain if it is a benefit that the assembler could not have internalized.
Thus, the existence of a positive externality may necessitate the use of eminent domain
(rather than secret buying agents) in certain limited situations but only if a clear
externality of a substantial magnitude exists and cannot otherwise be solved through a
subsidy.
2. Timing Problems and Collusion
Two additional objections involve the possibility of timing problems and the
potential for collusion. First, one of eminent domain’s advantages as a mechanism for
acquiring and aggregating land is that property may be obtained almost immediately.
That is, the use of eminent domain avoids the time and resources involved in bargaining.
By contrast, under the new theory, private developers must use buying agents to bargain
individually with each existing owner. However, such individualized bargaining may not
work if the buyer needs to assemble land quickly in order to exploit its highest and best
use. Indeed, some states actually have “quick take” procedures in which the government
(on behalf of a private developer) can acquire and demolish a person’s home or business
before the opportunity for a hearing. If the value of the project depends on the quick
acquisition of property, secret agents may be inadequate because they often require
several years to aggregate property in order to preserve anonymity.
However, the use of eminent domain is not always a faster mechanism than
buying agents for assembling land, and even when it may be quicker, it is not necessarily
socially desirable. The aggregate number of years spent executing redevelopment
projects (and often litigating the validity of condemnations) is usually greater than the
number of years necessary for buying agents to aggregate property through voluntary
transactions.162 Moreover, while eminent domain provides a preemptive mechanism for
immediate assemblage, it does so at the cost of foregoing more information about a
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project’s social desirability.163 Thus, even if secret buying agents sometimes take longer
than the use of eminent domain, this trade-off might still be socially desirable if the
benefits from preventing the socially undesirable transfers that eminent domain
sometimes allows outweigh the costs associated with delaying the acquisition.
Three other potential “timing” problems may exist with buying agents. First,
certain owners (e.g., owners who previously did not have their properties for sale), may
not choose to sell at any price that secret agents offer. These owners may become
suspicious that an assembly is occurring if a buyer approaches unexpectedly, especially if
buying agents continue to become an increasingly common practice. Second, acquiring
land through secret agents also requires private developers to bear high initial costs. A
private party is required to have a significant amount of investment capital before the
commencement of an assembly project. Third, a private developer might receive a lower
return on this land while the other parcels are being purchased because the developer
cannot commence the project until secret agents have purchased all of the parcels.
However, most existing owners do sell to secret buying agents at some price when the
offer price exceeds their actual value; most private parties (such as corporations, realestate developers, and casinos) usually have sufficient funding for initial costs, and most
private developers can receive a property’s rental value by leasing the land for its existing
use until all parcels have been assembled. Thus, these objections, while theoretically
plausible, may be relatively insignificant in practice.
Finally, because private developers must employ third parties as buying agents,
this mechanism raises the possibility of collusion between buying agents and existing
owners. For example, secret agents might tip off sellers or agree to a higher price in
exchange for a kickback. However, this collusion problem exists in every other agency
relationship in which a principal monitors its agents (albeit while incurring some agency
costs). Moreover, in practice, secret agents themselves often do not even know that they
are buying property for an assembly project.164 As noted above, developers using secret
purchases not only hide the identity of buying agents from existing owners and the public
but also hide the identity of buying agents from each other. Because of this double-blind
acquisition system in which each buying agent acts independently and anonymously, the
likelihood of corruption is relatively attenuated.
3. Distrust and Resentment
Finally, secret purchases may increase societal distrust and resentment. Because
transactions normally occur between two parties negotiating with full disclosure and
without buying agents, the use of such agents generally is viewed as deceptive. Existing
owners who discover that they have sold to developers through secret buying agents may
resent such buyers and distrust future buyers (even those not employing secret agents).
The possibility of creating such a trading environment, as well as its implications for a

163

Cf. Eric A. Posner & Alan O. Sykes, Optimal War and Jus Ad Bellum, 93 GEO. L.J. 993, 1004 (2005)
(noting that “delay in the use of force has value as a real option” because “information becomes better over
time”).
164
See, e.g., O’Reiley, supra note 100, at 2 (“[G]reat care was taken [by Disney] to make sure that none
of the buyers knew about each other, even if they worked in the same firm.”).

30
market economy, must therefore be explored and compared to the current institutional
arrangement.
Upon discovering that secret buying agents have assembled land discreetly,
individual sellers, as well as the affectedcommunit y, may resent the buyer’s use of such
agents. The citizens of Allston and the mayor of Boston, for example, were outraged that
Harvard University secretly purchased fourteen parcels of land for $88 million.165 The
Boston mayor was “so incensed that he adopted a mocking sing-song tone to mimic his
view of Harvard’s attitude, saying: ‘We’re from Harvard, and we’re going to do what we
want.”166 Likewise, members of the community were outraged at the University for its
secret land acquisitions.167 In response, Harvard officials spent a significant amount of
time and money, including voluntary payments to the government in lieu of property
taxes,168 reviving Harvard’s relationships and public image within the community.169
Perhaps more importantly, secret buying agents may create distrust between
normal buyers and sellers because sellers may be suspicious that a buyer is actually a
secret agent. Normally, buyers and sellers negotiate believing (and therefore, relying on
the fact) that the other party is acting in good faith and with full disclosure. However, if
some percentage of buyers are buying agents, sellers might become more suspicious and
less willing to sell without verification of a buyer’s identity or disclosure of a buyer’s
objective. As a result, the use of buying agents may create incidental monitoring costs.
Sellers, for example, might take socially wasteful precautions, such as spending time and
money investigating whether buyers are independent buyers or actually secret agents.
However, while secret buying agents may create some level of distrust and
resentment, the use of eminent domain (especially for private parties) causes similar
problems.170 Indeed, the level of resentment caused by a taking due to eminent domain
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may even be greater because of the government’s imprimatur171 and because
compensation usually will be undercompensatory.172 Moreover, the use of buying agents
may become less shocking as the number of developers using buying agents continues to
increase. Finally, while excessive monitoring may occur in certain circumstances,
administrative costs are generally higher for using eminent domain than secret agents.173
Thus, while the distrust and resentment associated with secret purchases are potential
concerns, these considerations—like the possibility of positive externalities, timing
problems, and collusion—either apply only in certain limited circumstances or do not
impose greater costs than the comparative institutional arrangement under eminent
domain. Overall, therefore, the availability of secret buying agents and the potential for
inordinate private influence generally makes eminent domain unnecessary for private
parties.
IV. APPLICATIONS OF THE NEW THEORY
A. Kelo and Economic Development
Promoting economic development can be defined broadly as any situation in
which the state transfers non-blighted property from one private owner to another in
order to increase the effective utilization of property. Because the use of eminent domain
for economic development often destroys existing homes or businesses, the asserted
public interest is usually based on the potential for incidental public benefits such as
increasing jobs or augmenting tax revenue. In Kelo, for example, city officials argued
that condemning over ninety homes and businesses to construct new office buildings and
a hotel was essential for increasing the city’s tax base and paying for schools and
services.174 However, applying the foregoing economic analysis to Kelo, secret
purchases (rather than eminent domain) should most likely have been used in attempting
to acquire these properties.

171

See Boudreaux, supra note 134, at 49 (“Being evicted from one’s home, by no fault of one’s own, is
likely to alienate one further from one’s government and community. This is especially true when the
locality is admittedly trying to replace certain housing stock—and perhaps even categories of people—with
others.”); cf. Boudreaux, Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 579
(2001) (“While people can view windfalls that befall another with sanguinity, when the windfall arrives as
a result of a strategic and deliberate decision of the government, the reaction may turn to resentment and
frustration.”).
172
See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
173
See The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Leading Cases, 119 HARV. L. REV. 287, 291, 296-97 (2005)
(“Eminent domain is much more costly than market exchange; it incurs the transaction costs that
accompany all legislative action; it involves procedural hurdles such as filing a judicial complaint, serving
process, and undertaking a professional appraisal of the property in question; it involves a hearing on both
‘the condemnation’s legality and the amount of compensation due’; and it may involve protracted
litigation.” (quoting Merrill, supra note 18, at 77)); Fischel, supra note 35, at 934 (“[C]ompared to
incremental, consensual transactions, eminent domain is quite costly for the government. Hiring attorneys
and appraisers, hearing appeals, and conducting trials adds to the cost of a given transaction. When
ordinary market transactions are available, they are normally cheaper for the government to use than
eminent domain.”); see also Garnett, supra note 131, at 969 (noting the “high ‘due process costs’ that
attend an exercise of eminent domain” (quoting Merrill, supra note 18, at 77-80)).
174
See supra note 71 and accompanying text.

32
Kelo represents the classic holdout situation because only seven property owners
refused to sell at the redevelopment corporation’s price. Secret agents could have
overcome this holdout problem through consensual transactions. The dozens of existing
owners who sold under the threat of eminent domain almost certainly would have sold to
buying agents as well, although these owners would have been more likely to receive full
compensation.175 Similarly, the seven existing owners who held out even under the threat
of eminent domain most likely would have sold to secret buying agents at some price
above their actual valuation of their homes. If these existing owners refused to sell (even
without being aware of the assembly project), then these owners presumably valued the
property more highly than the developer. The anonymity of secret agents would have
eliminated any possibility of the existing owners’ opportunistically inflating their selling
prices. Thus, secret buying agents, like eminent domain, could have prevented any
strategic holdout among existing owners.
However, unlike eminent domain, secret buying agents would have eliminated the
possibility of an erroneous taking. By ignoring the actual value of the property to the
homeowners, the redevelopment corporation’s use of eminent domain may have
compelled a property transfer that was socially undesirable if the owners’ subjective
values deviated from the market value. In this case, the evidence that the existing owners
attach a great deal of sentimental value to their properties,176 coupled with the relatively
speculative nature of the project’s future benefits,177 suggests that the wisdom of using
eminent domain to assemble the property was questionable. The use of secret purchases,
by contrast, would have forced the developer to take into account the actual costs of the
project and make an accurate estimation of the expected benefits.
Furthermore, the possibility in Kelo of an erroneous taking was also relatively
high because of the existence of substantial private influence. New London delegated its
power of eminent domain to a private economic development organization.178 In turn,
the economic development corporation negotiated with a developer for a ninety-nine year
lease for the rent of one dollar per year.179 The influence of the Pfizer Corporation
(featured on the development corporation’s own web site) also affected the New London
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project.180 Indeed, the stated purpose of the redevelopment project was to complement
Pfizer’s new facility.181 Finally, the development corporation also exempted an Italian
Dramatic Club, a politically well-connected organization, while condemning every
adjacent home.182
The favorable lease terms and the political exemptions likely resulted because the
beneficiaries of the project, the real-estate developer and Pfizer, were both wellorganized, well-financed private entities that saw a substantial profit-making opportunity.
Thus, unlike a highway through New London that would have had multiple, dispersed
beneficiaries, the New London project provided a concentrated benefit for both the
developer and Pfizer. These private actors thus had an extremely high incentive to
capture and utilize eminent domain for their own advantage. In contrast, the condemnees
(homeowners with few financial resources and little legal sophistication) were relatively
dispersed. The ninety existing homes and small businesses thus faced a much more
difficult coordination problem than the development corporation, which was led by a
former Admiral of the United States Navy and whose Board included attorneys,
accountants, the former Mayor of the City, and a Yale law professor. Not surprisingly,
more than ninety percent of property owners sold their property instead of expending
their own limited legal and financial resources to challenge the condemnations.183
The only remaining determination is whether private parties lacked a sufficient
incentive to purchase the New London properties because of a substantial positive
externality that could have prevented an otherwise socially desirable transaction. Here,
the project’s proponents argued that the development plan was “projected to create in
excess of 1,000 jobs, to increase tax and other revenues, and to revitalize an economically
distressed city.”184 However, more jobs and higher tax revenue in themselves do not
constitute positive externalities. Private developers could have contributed these same
benefits if they acquired the land through secret purchases rather than by eminent
domain. But even if other externalities existed and even assuming that a public subsidy
would not have been possible, it is unclear that any such externality would have been of a
magnitude that was likely to create a significant difference in the private and social
incentives for assembling the property.
Moreover, other potential counterarguments are also unpersuasive in this case.
Timing does not seem to be a problem because the economic development corporation
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has been trying to redevelop this area for several years.185 The litigation surrounding the
case took over four years—more than enough time for buying agents to acquire the land
through consensual transactions.186 The danger of collusion is also relatively low; other
firms have used secret agents successfully in aggregating land in similar situations and a
developer could have prevented its own buying agents from learning of the larger
assembly project.187 Finally, while resentment may have occurred if secret agents had
been used, it is clear that substantial resentment already exists among those owners who
challenged the city’s condemnations to the U.S. Supreme Court and are now being forced
from their homes.188 Thus, secret purchases may have been superior to eminent domain
for assembling property and promoting economic development within the city of New
London.189
B. Berman and Blight
While the use of eminent domain for economic development allows the taking of
property for private benefit even with an existing productive use, the use of eminent
domain for eliminating blight involves property that is affirmatively deleterious to the
surrounding community. Traditional characteristics of blight include abandoned and
physically-deteriorating buildings, as well as health concerns over the spread of
disease.190 Modern definitions of blight, by contrast, include such characteristics as “too185
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N.Y. TIMES, at A20 (June 24, 2005) (quoting plaintiff Susette Kelo) (“I am sick. Do they have any idea
what they’ve done?”); id. (quoting plaintiff Bill Von Winkle) (“It’s desperately hard to believe that in this
country you can lose your home to private developers. It’s basically corporate theft.”).
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In addition to assembly projects as in Kelo, municipalities and private developers also use eminent
domain for the purpose of redeveloping a single parcel of land. For example, a city or town may want to
replace an existing business (such as a mom-and-pop store) with a new business (such as a national chain)
that could potentially bring in more tax revenue or create more jobs. Applying the foregoing economic
analysis, private parties actually confront fewer bargaining problems for acquiring single properties than
assembling multiple properties because the holdout problem disappears. The counterarguments against
secret buying agents are also less convincing for a single property. In particular, timing is not an issue
because there is no need to space secret purchases and a buying agent is used only once. Consequently, the
possibility of detection is much lower, collusion is easier to monitor, and resentment and excessive
precautions are less likely. Thus, this use of eminent domain for economic development appears even less
justified in this single-property situation than in the assembly situation.
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See Ilya Somin, Overcoming Poletown: County of Wayne v. Hathcock, Economic Development
Takings, and the Future of Public Use, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV 1005, 1034 (2005) (“Early blight cases in
the 1940s and 1950s upheld condemnations in areas that closely fit the layperson’s intuitive notion of
‘blight’: dilapidated, dangerous, disease-ridden neighborhoods.”); Note, Public Use as a Limitation on
Eminent Domain in Urban Renewal, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1424 (1955) (“[I]ncidental use of eminent
domain to acquire private property will also be necessary to eliminate blight by removing nonconforming
buildings, dilapidated houses which discourage neighbors from maintaining adjoining property, and
perhaps even sound buildings which are crowded too closely together.”).

35
small side yards, ‘diverse ownership’ (different people own properties next to each
other), ‘inadequate planning,’ and lack of a two-car attached garage.”191 Furthermore,
blight designations often include both blighted and non-blighted properties.192 Most
courts generally view eliminating blight as an adequate justification for eminent domain,
even when the government eventually transfers the condemned property to another
private party for a private objective.193 However, courts and commentators often fail to
address the important initial question of what constitutes blight.
A determination of blight, properly understood, should be based on the existence
of a negative externality stemming from the property itself.194 A blighted area may
impose negative externalities on neighboring homes and businesses.195 Abandoned
buildings, for example, might cause negative externalities by deterring new owners from
investing in the community, increasing the likelihood of criminal activity, or facilitating
the transmission of infectious diseases.196 Blight thus may be understood as a nuisance—
a condition imposing a negative externality on one’s neighbors—without the
corresponding benefit characteristic of some nuisances (e.g., practicing a musical
instrument in an apartment or barbecuing a meal in a backyard).197
Traditional economic analysis suggests several possibilities for dealing with
negative externalities through legal rules including liability, corrective taxes, and
subsidies.198 Yet all of these possible solutions are inadequate for eliminating blight.
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BERLINER, supra note 8, at 5; see, e.g., Penn. Stat. § 1702 (2002) (defining blight as “inadequate
planning,” “excessive land coverage by buildings,” “lack of adequate air and light,” “defective design and
arrangement of buildings,” or “economically or socially undesirable land uses”).
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See NICHOLS § 7.06[7][c][iv] (“In general, urban renewal projects seek to clear enough unsafe and
unsanitary blight by condemning an entire area even though some buildings within the designated area may
not be blighted.”). But cf. Pequonnock Yacht Club, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 790 A.2d 1178, 1184 (Conn.
2002) (holding condemnation of non-blighted property unconstitutional because “property that is not
substandard and that is the subject of a taking within a redevelopment area must be essential to the
redevelopment plan in order for the agency to justify its taking”).
193
See, e.g., City of Phoenix v. Superior Court, County of Maricopa, 671 P.2d 387, 389 (Ariz. 1983)
(stating that it is “generally accepted” that “the taking of property in a so-called slum or blighted area for
the purpose of clearing and ‘redevelopment,’” constitutes a “public use” even when “sale [occurs] before or
after reconstruction to a private person or entity for operation of a public or private business”); Sinas v.
City of Lansing, 170 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Mich. 1969) (classifying the “elimination of urban blight [a]s an
adequate justification for the exercise of the power of eminent domain . . . even where the acquisition is
followed by sale to private individuals”).
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See generally James Buchanan & Craig Stubblebine, Externalities, 29 ECONOMICA 371 (1962).
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See Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 IOWA L.
REV. 1, 79 (2000) (characterizing situations of “aesthetic blight” as “negative externalities imposed on
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See Richard K. Green & Michelle J. White, Urban Abandonments: A Possible Cause and
Consequences 15 (working paper on file with the New York University Law Review) (concluding that
“abandonments are good predictors of negative externalities”); William T. Nachbaur, Empty Houses:
Abandoned Buildings in the Inner City, 17 HOW. L.J. 3, 10-11 (1971) (describing how abandoned buildings
drive away residents and owners).
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See Fennell, supra note 195, at 984-85 (“The case for clearing blight land is essentially a nuisancecontrol rationale that hinges on the negative externalities generated by the land in its present condition.”);
cf. Kelo, 545 U.S. __, 125 S.Ct. at 2685 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“In Berman, for example, if the slums at
issue were truly ‘blighted,’ then state nuisance law, not the power of eminent domain, would provide the
appropriate remedy.”).
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For a discussion and comparison of types of legal rules for controlling externalities, see SHAVELL,
supra note 17, at 92-101.
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The imposition of liability would allow affected homeowners to bring suit against the
owners of the blighted property in order to provide a financial incentive to reduce
harmful externalities. In the context of eminent domain, however, such a solution seems
problematic because the dispersed victims of blight (who may be difficult to identify in
the first place) usually will not have a financial incentive to bring suit against the
property owner creating the externality, who may also be judgment proof. Similarly,
corrective taxes—fines paid to the state in the amount of expected harm—would be
infeasible because the owners of blighted property may not have enough money to pay
for the damage inflicted by the blight. A subsidy, while potentially useful for positive
externalities,199 would be problematic for negative externalities because a subsidy would
create a moral hazard problem. Specifically, existing owners could opportunistically
impose blight externalities on their neighbors in order to receive a government subsidy.200
A negative externality, however, also could be resolved through private
bargaining.201 If a blighted property is imposing negative externalities on surrounding
areas, the affected owners could bargain with the owner of the blighted property to
eliminate the blight-causing condition or to purchase the blighted property. But
bargaining with the existing owner to eliminate blight is unlikely to be successful. The
transactions costs of organizing all affected property owners are likely to be prohibitive,
especially because existing owners would have an incentive to free ride off of their
neighbors. Moreover, convincing the owner to sell his property may also be difficult. If
a private developer seeks to assemble several blighted parcels for a new project, the holdout problem wouldonce again inhibit bargaining. As a result, secret purchases might be
necessary to overcome the negative externalities caused by blight.
Applying the foregoing economic analysis to Berman v. Parker, 202 the theory
seems to cut in two different directions. On the one hand, the main drawback of eminent
domain—i.e., mistakenly taking land from its highest-valued user—is less problematic
because the blighted land is vacant or unproductive. Existing owners are thus less likely
to attach sentimental or idiosyncratic value to these properties.203 On the other hand, the
counterarguments against secret buying agents seem weaker than in the case of economic
development. The problem of unwilling sellers is less likely to occur with blighted
properties than with properties with an existing use. Furthermore, distrust and resentment
seem less likely because owners of blighted properties usually do not have sentimental or
idiosyncratic attachment to their property. Thus, while eminent domain is unlikely to
cause socially undesirable transactions in the context of blight, secret buying agents are
equally effective for overcoming the holdout problem.
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See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
See Fennell, supra note 195, at 985 (“If the use is inflicting costs on the surrounding area, then the
owner under ordinary market conditions might well be able to hold out for a large share of the surplus that
will be delivered from the discontinuance of the use. But . . . [t]he incentives for extortionate behavior are
clear enough if people are allowed to create bad situations and then glean some of the surplus associated
with relieving the negative condition.”).
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For a discussion of the possibility of resolving externalities through bargaining, see SHAVELL, supra
note 17, at 101-09.
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348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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See Fennell, supra note 195, at 985 (“[T]he owners of blighted land are unlikely to enjoy any
significant (legitimate) subjective premium. To the extent the land is worth more to these owners than fair
market value, we might say that the surplus arises from a willingness to offload costs onto neighbors and
tenants, rather than from any affirmative, site-specific investments in the community.”).
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However, an unusual type of corruption exists in the context of blight that makes
secret purchases preferable to eminent domain. If a state law prohibits economic
development as a public use, a city may use a blight designation as a pretext for using
eminent domain for economic development. In these situations, the blight designation
often includes productive businesses and inhabited homes with no obvious characteristics
of blight.
For example, in Gamble v. City of Norwood,204 the city council designed a $125million project for upscale retail and luxury condominiums that would require ousting
seventy-seven families.205 The council labeled the neighborhood as “deteriorating” and
threatened a blight designation, even though the neighborhood’s middle-class homes
were well-kept and typically sold for more than $100,000.206 Similarly, in Lakewood,
Ohio, a real estate developer planned to assemble land for 200 condominiums.207 Sixtysix existing colonial homes were deemed blighted,208 even though, under the relevant
criteria (which included the lack of a two-car attached garage), the homes of the mayor
and entire city council would also have been blighted.209 Overall, using blight as a
pretext for economic development has become increasingly common.210
In these cases, a pretextual doctrinal label in a municipal ordinance or statute
should not alter the underlying functional analysis.211 Unlike cases involving actual
blight, cases involving pretextual blight do not involve a negative externality. As a
result, buying agents can purchase property in these case just as they can in cases
involving the assembly of multiple properties for economic development. In contrast, the
use of eminent domain could cause a socially undesirable transfer. Furthermore, all
instances of pretextual blight are essentially instances of corruption because the
municipality or corporation attempts to condemn property on the basis of blight, even
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though it could not have condemned the property for the purpose of economic
development.212
Overall, secret buying agents work just as well as eminent domain in eliminating
the negative externalities of actual blight and are a better mechanism in cases involving
pretextual blight. The use of eminent domain should therefore be disfavored in all cases
of asserted blight.
C. Instrumentalities and Utilities
Finally, while secret purchases are an effective mechanism for assembling land
for promoting economic development and eliminating urban blight, secret buying agents
are actually ineffective in certain other circumstances. Specifically, secret agents are
ineffective for assembling land for both the instrumentalities of commerce (e.g.,
railroads, canals, or private highways) and private utility operations (e.g., telephone lines,
oil pipes, or electric wires). Both of these uses require long, thin, and continuous pieces
of land that are difficult to assemble without being detected. If, for example, Amtrak
attempts to lay railroad track or Commonwealth Edison attempts to lay utility lines, the
secrecy of such a project is difficult (if not impossible) to maintain even through secret
buying agents. However, because these situations have long been considered public uses
(even while including private transfers), these exceptions further illustrate the relevance
of secret agents for distinguishing between public and private uses.
The use of eminent domain traditionally has been allowed for aggregating thin,
continuous pieces of land even for private parties for primarily private objectives. Courts
have upheld the transfer of property for both the instrumentalities of commerce and
private utility companies. For example, the United States Supreme Court and courts in
every state have upheld the use of eminent domain for acquiring property for laying
railroad track.213 Likewise, the use of eminent has been upheld for digging irrigation
ditches and canals, piping oil, distributing artificial light and power, laying telephone
wires, and laying coaxial cable and fiber optic lines.214
Courts have upheld these uses of eminent domain because the “very existence” of
these projects depends on government coordination.215 In these circumstances the
probability of public knowledge of the project is likely to be so high that even secret
agents could not prevent the holdout problem. As the Michigan Supreme Court stated in
Hathcock:
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track).
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dissenting).
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[A] corporation constructing a railroad . . . must lay track so that it forms a
more or less straight path from point A to point B. If a property owner
between points A and B holds out—say, for example, by refusing to sell
his land for any amount less than fifty times its appraised value—the
construction of the railroad is halted unless and until the railroad accedes
to the property owner’s demands. And if owners of adjoining properties
receive word of the original property owner’s windfall, they too will
refuse to sell.216
The almost inevitable dissemination of information about the path of a proposed project
thus causes a holdout problem for the developer, for whom it will be economically
infeasible to abandon the existing route.217 Because maintaining the secrecy of these
projects would be virtually impossible, secret purchases would be unable to overcome the
holdout problem.218 As a result, these transactions require the use of eminent domain.219
However, these types of takings have long been considered to be constitutionally
legitimate public uses even though they involved the transfer of property from one
private owner to another.220 That is, the use of secret agents is infeasible in precisely the
areas where eminent domain traditionally has been used in private transfers. Thus, rather
than undermining the secret-agent theory, these exceptions ultimately provide further
evidence that the feasibility (or infeasibility) of secret buying agents provides a useful
mechanism for distinguishing between public and private uses.221
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County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W. 2d 765, 781-82 (Mich. 2004); cf. Dayton Mining Co. v.
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See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 782 (“The likelihood that property owners will engage in this tactic
makes the acquisition of property for railroads, gas lines, highways, and other such ‘instrumentalities of
commerce’ a logistical and practical nightmare. Accordingly, this Court has held that the exercise of
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essential improvements, all of which require particular configurations of property narrow and generally
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Private parties regularly attempt to use eminent domain in several other situations. In a working
paper, I apply the foregoing analysis regarding secret purchases and private influence to a number of other
circumstances: (i) the dilemma of landlocked property; (ii) the utilization of unique property; (iii) the
expansion of existing facilities; (iv) and the redistribution of land. The dilemma of landlocked property
involves a landlocked property owner who seeks to use eminent domain to take an easement through his
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V. CONCLUSION: THE NEW THEORY AND ITS ADVANTAGES
The foregoing analysis and applications demonstrate the feasibility (and indeed,
necessity) of a new legal standard for the public use requirement. The theory based on
secret purchases and private influence provides this standard. Like eminent domain, the
use of buying agents overcomes the holdout problem among strategic sellers. But unlike
eminent domain, the use of buying agents ensures that all transfers are socially
desirable.222 The use of eminent domain for private parties also increases the potential
for inordinate private influence.223 Consequently, a developer who wishes to utilize the
state’s condemnation authority must demonstrate either that a significant positive
externality would go unrealized or that buying agents would be impracticable.224 In all
other situations, the use of secret buying agents provides a superior mechanism for
assembling property.
The theory of public use based on secret purchases and private influence also
provides an administrable standard for legislative and judicial decisionmaking. Courts
have been reluctant to review public use determinations because of their wariness about
making cost-benefit calculations under informational uncertainty.225 As a result, most
courts, assuming that the legislature is the more appropriate branch for these
judgments,226 have deferred to almost all legislative determination s of public use.227 In
neighbor’s land for his private benefit. See, e.g., Tolksdorf v. Griffith, 626 N.W. 2d 163 (Mich. 2001)
(condemnation for private road). The utilization of unique property involves the use of eminent domain to
acquire property that is unique because of its location or idiosyncratic topographical characteristics. See,
e.g., Williams v. Hyrum Gibbons & Sons Co., 602 P.2d 684 (Utah 1979) (condemnation for mobile
telephone transmitter station). The expansion of existing facilities involves the use of eminent domain
against one’s neighbors to acquire more property for an existing use. See, e.g., 99 Cents Only v. Lancaster
Redevelopment Agency, No. 01-56338, 2003 WL 932421 (9th Cir. Mar. 7, 2003) (condemnation for
expanding Costco warehouse). Finally, the redistribution of land involves the use of eminent domain to
create more equitable land ownership or to prevent an oligopoly. See, e.g., Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (condemnations for transferring property from landlords to tenants). These
variations, which remain relatively unexplored, suggest further extensions of the secret-agent theory for
future inquiry.
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United States ex rel. TVA v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 552 (1946) (stating that “courts deciding on what is and
is not a governmental function” is “a practice which has proved impracticable in other fields”); see also
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subjective . . . . It would simply lead to judges second guessing legislative cost/benefit calculations
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See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. __, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 2668 (2005) (declining to “secondguess the City’s considered judgments about the efficacy of its development plan”); Schweiker v. Wilson,
450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981) (characterizing the legislature as “the appropriate representative body through
which the public makes democratic choices among alternative solutions to social and economic problems”);
see also Garnett, supra note 131, at 962 (“Judicial deference to a decision to exercise eminent-domain
power is predicated on the assumption that the elected branches of government are in a better position than
the courts to determine what uses of land are in the ‘public interest,’ and, moreover, that the elected
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contrast, the new theory provides an intelligible principle for both legislative and judicial
decisionmaking because the limitations on public use are determined through voluntary
exchanges. Neither legislatures nor courts must project anticipated benefits, calculate
sentimental losses, or rely on uncertain cost-benefit determinations.228 Requiring
voluntary transactions through buying agents thus avoids a reliance on excessive
centralized planning by government officials who not only lack perfect information but
also are subject to private influence.229
Moreover, the new theory is consistent with the constitutional text—“nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation”230—because, as
explained above, the use of eminent domain for private parties actually provides no
additional “public benefit.” In many instances the use of eminent domain for private
transfers actually decreases overall social welfare by allowing transactions in which the
existing owners value the property more highly than the private assembler. In contrast,
the secret-agent mechanism enables a transaction if and only if the transaction is mutually
beneficial and therefore in the public interest (i.e., for a “public use”). 231
Finally, the new theory is also consistent with actual practice. The theory is
consistent with the traditional exceptions to the rule prohibiting condemnations for
private objectives. It allows eminent domain precisely where secret buying agents would
be impracticable for aggregating land (e.g., for railroad or utilities).232 The theory is also
consistent with current practices. Developers frequently utilize secret agents to avoid the
holdout problem and assemble property.233 Furthermore, the theory is applicable to a
wide variety of situations—including promoting economic development (as in Kelo) and
eliminating urban blight (as in Berman).234
Because of its superiority over the status quo, the theory of public use based on
secret purchases and private influence also serves as a mechanism for reforming eminent
domain law. First, the theory is useful for legislative decisionmaking with regard to both
drafting statutory language and determining whether to use eminent domain for specific
private projects.235 As the majority in Kelo states, arguments that the need for eminent
domain has been exaggerated because private developers can use other mechanisms

branches are more accountable than the judiciary regardless of whether their decisions are substantively
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Indeed, immediately following the Kelo decision, bills were introduced in both the U.S. Congress and
Connecticut state legislature that would prohibit the use of eminent domain for the purpose of private
economic development. See They Paved Paradise, WALL. ST. J., at A12 (June 30, 2005) (noting bipartisan
Congressional legislation that would prohibit the federal government from “using the power of eminent
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including “secret negotiations” are “certainly matters of legitimate public debate.”236
Second, in the wake of Kelo, litigation over the scope of the public use requirement will
increasingly move to state courts.237 Currently, more states disallow the use of eminent
domain for private economic development than explicitly allow this use,238 but many
other state courts are likely to consider this same issue over the next several years.239
And third, the possibility of Kelo being reconsidered (and possibly overruled) is neither
implausible nor unlikely (especially in light of the Court’s five-to-four decision). Indeed,
the unanimous overruling of Poletown in Hathcock signaled the possibility of judicial
reconsideration of whether economic development constitutes a legitimate public use.
Finally, even after Kelo, the limitations of the Public Use Clause are still
relatively indeterminate because the Court did not enunciate a test for interpreting the
public use requirement.240 The Court did maintain that a city would violate the Public
Use Clause by taking land for a private party or for a private benefit.241 Likewise, Justice
Kennedy’s concurring opinion proposed heightened scrutiny for a taking involving
private favoritism—a suggestion that seems to acknowledge the concern for inordinate
private influence.242 But both the majority and Justice Kennedy left unanswered the
question of how courts determine when a taking becomes too private and thus when a
taking can no longer be considered a public use.243
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By contrast, the theory based on secret purchases and private influence indicates
those circumstances in which eminent domain provides no public benefit. The feasibility
of secret buying agents in most circumstances makes the use of eminent domain for
private parties not only unnecessary but also socially undesirable. Takings for private
parties also create the potential for inordinate private influence as private actors have a
socially perverse incentive to acquire eminent domain to obtain a concentrated benefit
without bearing a project’s costs. But because of the nature of democratic deliberation
and the fact that most public projects are known in advance, the state cannot use buying
agents and instead must rely on eminent domain for public takings. These takings for the
general public are also less subject to private influence. The new theory thus provides a
way of distinguishing between public and private uses.
Overall, therefore, the theory of “public use” based on the role of secret buying
agents and the potential for inordinate private influence provides a superior mechanism
for both legislative and judicial decisionmaking.
The theory offers a coherent and
administrable approach for interpreting the public use requirement—an issue about which
courts have often lamented that there is “no agreement, either in reasoning or
conclusion.”244 Future empirical work is necessary to confirm the feasibility of buying
agents in various applications.245 This empirical work will become ever more relevant as
private parties increasingly recognize the effectiveness of (and thus increasingly utilize)
these agents. At the very least, however, the foregoing analysis hopefully has
demonstrated that further efforts at providing a definition of public use are not
necessarily “doomed to fail.”246
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See, e.g., Munch, supra note 90, at 473 (concluding empirically that, “contrary to traditional
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